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LABOR INJUNCTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY:
THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA FIREWALL
Michael C. Duff*
INTRODUCTION
This article will show that federal courts have lacked, and continue to
lack, authority to enjoin private sector employees from peacefully striking,
picketing, or leafleting in connection with labor disputes, including those
arising in bankruptcy. The source of this broad prohibition is a statutory
firewall1 known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act.2 The narrow exception to the
rule is that federal courts may enjoin peaceful labor conduct, in extremely
limited circumstances, to harmonize the NLGA with certain duties required
of unions under the Railway Labor Act or under Section 301 of the LaborManagement Relations Act.3
As the article was in its formative stages, a full-blown season of the
bankruptcy of unionized firms (among others) emerged from the preexisting
general chaos of the American economy. 4 Some of the events making up
this season received significant news coverage. Chrysler and General
Motors, both unionized automakers, filed for bankruptcy in the late spring
of 2009.5 In roughly the same 6-month time period, the Republic Windows
*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West
Chester University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. I am thankful to
Richard Bales, Thomas Ciantra, Victoria Klein, and Richard Seltzer for their helpful
suggestions. Thanks are also due to Kristin Drennan, who provided research assistance
during the article’s early stages. All errors are mine. During the research and writing of
this article, I received generous financial support from the George Hopper Faculty
Research Fund, for which I am grateful.
1
A firewall is defined as: "a fireproof wall to prevent the spread of fire, as from one
room or compartment to the next; [or] anything serving as a protective barrier; specif., a
program or system designed to protect a computer network from unauthorized access, as
over the Internet." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2009)
2
29 U.S.C. §101 et seq. Hereinafter, the shorthand "NLGA" will be used frequently in
lieu of the full statutory reference.
3
Anti-injunctive provisions of the National Labor Relations Act are an additional
exception, but they are sought by and granted to the Government rather than a private
litigant, and only in specialized statutory circumstances. See infra Section I.C.
4
Total Bankruptcy Filings Increase Nearly 35 Percent over First Quarter 2008;
Business Filings Jump Over 64 Percent, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, June
9,
2009
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=57797&TEM
PLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited July 2, 2009) (observing that American
Bankruptcy Institute expected total bankruptcy filings to surge past 1.4 million by the end
of 2009).
5
Among the many articles see Chrysler files for bankruptcy protection: Obama says
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and Hartmarx companies became embroiled in unusual bankruptcy (or nearbankruptcy) controversies in which the unions representing their employees
attempted to influence their respective financiers' decisions concerning
whether to extend operating credit to the companies.6 These companies
have probably escaped this round of bankruptcy proceedings without
serious labor strife,7 though the materialization of subsequent rounds is not
unimaginable. Each of the scenarios nevertheless serves as a reminder of
both the potential for labor disputes between unions and bankrupt
employers, in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, and of the variety that
such disputes may assume. Thorny -- even unprecedented8 -- issues could
automaker will 'thrive' in partnership with Italy's Fiat, Associated Press, MSNBC, April
30, 2009 available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30489906// (last visited June 27,
2009), Kevin Krolicki and John Crawley, GM files for bankruptcy, Chrysler sale cleared,
REUTERS,
June
1,
2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN3044658620090601 (last visited June 27,
2009), Nelson Lichtenstein, Time for Another Reuther Plan: Autoworkers should confront
this crisis as they would have in the past: boldly and visibly, THE NATION, June 1, 2009
at 16 (concluding that "time has run out" for Chrysler and General Motors).
6
Hartmarx, President Obama's reputed suit maker of choice, filed for bankruptcy in
January 2009. The Union representing Hartmarx's employees objected to Wells Fargo's
reluctance to approve of the company's acquisition by a British company, Emerisque
Brands, in lieu of liquidation. The protest assumed the form of a rally with an
accompanying threat to take over the Hartmarx factory and “sit in” if Wells Fargo
attempted to liquidate the company. See Kia Carter, Hartmarx dilemma may cost 300 jobs
in
Rock
Island,
CHI.TRIB.,
May
12,
2009
available
at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/wqad-hartmarx-jobs-rockisland051209,0,3739223.story (last visited June 27, 2009). Emerisque eventually received the
approval of the bankruptcy court to take over Hartmarx. Bankruptcy court OKs sale of
suitmaker Hartmarx, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2009. Republic Windows had closed its doors
earlier, in December 2008, and unionized employees in response promptly staged an actual
sit in. The drama surrounding the sit in transpired prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. See Steven Gray, Republic Windows Sit-In: What are Workers Owed?, TIME,
December
8,
2008
available
at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1865226,00.html (last visited June 27,
2009). Whether these job actions were in themselves lawful or protected under federal
labor law is beyond the scope of this article.
7
Most significantly, the United Autoworkers union agreed to a series of concessions
as part of a larger agreement between the Government and General Motors. See UAW
agrees to new GM deal: Union agrees with change in funding for retiree health care, one
of key obstacles GM needed to clear to avoid bankruptcy. But other hurdles remain,
CNNMONEY.COM,
May
21,
2009
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/21/news/companies/gm_uaw/ (last visited June 27, 2009).
As circumstances have unfolded, it appears this agreement was a necessary preliminary to
the bankruptcy filing.
8
It will be difficult, for example, even to describe the reorganized General Motors
venture. Even elementary predicates may be difficult to establish: Who is the employer?
(Government? Union? Taxpayers?) What is the union? (Owner? Representative of the
employees?). Once the predicates have been established, the ensuing analyses of particular
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become a subject of contention between bankrupt employers and unions
representing their employees. These issues lie at the intersection of labor
and bankruptcy law. 9 This article addresses a narrow but important
question at the threshold of this murky doctrinal interface. If a union
strikes, pickets or leaflets a bankrupt employer, after the employer has filed
a bankruptcy petition, may a federal court grant an injunction (or enforce a
statutory stay) suspending the conduct?10 The question of injunctions in
labor disputes has been important for as long as there has been a labor
movement: a labor injunction issued against a union during the early stages
of a strike will tend to permanently defeat the strike.11
Some observers speculated that the United Autoworkers would feel
compelled to strike over the unprecedented concessions the union was
issues are unlikely to become less complex.
9
The discussion throughout the article presumes a "reorganization" filing under
Chapter 11 of the Code, and the employer-debtor is presumed to be the debtor-inpossession -- an employer that has been permitted to continue direct operation of its
business. The article also presumes that an employer rather than a bankruptcy trustee
would be attempting to obtain an injunction, but this need not be so.
10
Almost all legal doctrine and academic commentary on this issue was authored in
the 1980s. See Elsinore Shore Associates vs. Local 54, Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, 820 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1987); Briggs Transportation Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1984); Crowe &
Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir.
1983); Petrusch v Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297 (2nd Cir.1981) cert. denied, 456 U.S.
974, 102 S.Ct. 2238, 72 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982); see also Thomas R. Haggard, The Power of
the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Strikes: Resolving the Apparent Conflict Between the Code
and the Anti-Injunction Provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
703 (1985) [hereinafter, Apparent Conflict]; Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Financial
Crises upon Collective Bargaining Relationships, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 465 (1988)
[hereinafter, Impact of Financial Crises]; Stephen L. Poe, Note, The Automatic Stay of the
1978 Code Versus the Norris LaGuardia Act: A Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, 61 Tex. L.
Rev. 321, 327-28 (1982) [hereinafter, Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma]; Nancy L. Lowndes,
Note, Workers' Rights against a Bankrupt Employer, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 545 (1985)
[hereinafter, Workers' Rights].
The 1980s commentary was appropriate because business bankruptcy filings during
that period rose by roughly 60%, from 48,125, in 1981, to 82,446 in 1987. ANNUAL
BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS FILINGS BY YEAR (1980-2008), AMERICAN
BANKRUPTCY
INSTITUTE
available
at
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=57826&T
EMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
The past is prologue. Business bankruptcy filings rose from 28,322, in 2007, to
43,546, in 2008. There have been 14,319 business bankruptcy filings in the first quarter of
2009 alone. See id. It would seem an appropriate time, therefore, to resume the discussion.
11
FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
201 (The MacMillan Co. 1930): "The injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo . .
. The suspension of activities affects only the strikers; the employer resumes his efforts to
defeat the strike, and resumes them free from the interdicted interferences." Id.
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asked to make under the agreement between General Motors and the U.S.
Government, which facilitated the automaker's survival.12 In the General
Motors context this kind of speculation was probably idle because a strike
could have prompted the Government to withdraw taxpayer funding of the
company, leading to the company's liquidation and the loss of union jobs.13
But in the Republic Windows and Hartmarx matters, workers with much
less likelihood of retaining jobs, and therefore probably with less to lose,
engaged in audacious sit-down strikes (or credibly threatened such
strikes).14 Even in the context of the complex automakers' agreements,
hammered out in bankruptcy court between creditors and bankrupt
employers, where unions have at least some hope of holding on to at least
some jobs (and would therefore be less likely to take risks), labor disputes
could conceivably arise at the eleventh hour.15
The kinds of labor disputes that could arise after a unionized employer
files a petition in bankruptcy would be extremely varied. Unions might, for
example, strike, picket or leaflet over a court's authorization for an
employer to reject a collective bargaining agreement that existed prior to the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.16 Even absent a preexisting
12

Justin Hyde and Tim Higgins, UAW Strike would kill auto loans. Auto rescue terms
raise stakes in deal mandating changes in pay, benefits, DETROIT FREE PRESS, January
9, 2009 available at http://www.freep.com/article/20090109/BUSINESS01/901090397/
(last visited June 27, 2009).
13
Id.
14
See Steven Greenhouse, Workers Pressure Bank to Keep Clothier's U.S. Plants
Open,
N.
Y.
Times,
May
11,
2009
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/12hartmarx.html?_r=1&scp=13&sq=Hartma
rx&st=cse (last visited June 24, 2009).
15
A bankruptcy court may also retain jurisdiction of a case after it confirms a
reorganization plan, if necessary to ensure the plan is being properly implemented.
Goodman v. Phillip R. Curtis Enterprises, 809 F.2d 228, 232 (4th Cir. 1987). As testimony
to the complexity of the automakers reorganization cases, Jones Day, the lead law firm in
the Chrysler reorganization, reportedly petitioned the federal district court in Manhattan to
authorize payment by Chrysler of 114.7 million dollars. Restructuring transaction costs
probably exceeded 372 million dollars. Linda Sandler, Chrysler Lawyers Seek Fees Before
Other
Creditors,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
May
7,
2009
available
athttp://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601127&sid=agun7zOPdHNg&refer=law
(last visited June 24, 2009). Though the automakers bankruptcy cases appear to have
sailed through the reorganization process, see Micheline Maynard, Automakers' Swift
Cases in Bankruptcy Shock Experts, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2009 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/business/07bankruptcy.html?emc=eta1 (last visited
July 9, 2009), one wonders whether that should be cause for celebration or concern. One
can imagine, for example, intense periods when reductions in force, simple on paper, are
actually being implemented.
16
Rejection or modification of the agreement may be authorized by a bankruptcy court
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1113; see e.g. Briggs v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
supra n.10, 739 F.2d 341 (holding that peaceful picketing by union protesting
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collective bargaining agreement – where, for example, a newly certified
union did not have time to negotiate such an agreement before an employer
filed for bankruptcy -- the union might nevertheless protest modifications to
non-contractual terms and conditions of employment, or might object to the
mere proposal of changes. Aside from specific employment issues, a union
might picket or strike to protest the conduct of the bankruptcy proceedings
themselves.17
Some legal commentators have asserted that there is a sound rationale
supporting the general injunctive authority of federal bankruptcy courts
over labor disputes, despite the existence of the NLGA, a statute meant to
exclude the federal judiciary in its entirety from injunctive involvement in
labor disputes.18 The Supreme Court has never addressed the question, and
only four Federal circuits have squarely reached it -- roughly a quartercentury ago -- under the modern Bankruptcy Code.19
This article’s thesis is that under the NLGA, a “super-statute” that has
remained undisturbed by courts since 1932, federal courts lack jurisdiction
to issue injunctions in labor disputes arising under the Bankruptcy Code of
1978. Exceptions to the NLGA’s anti-injunction provisions are rare and
have arisen only when courts have read the NLGA in pari materia with
other labor statutes "as a part of a pattern of labor legislation."20 Part I of
the article considers the NLGA in terms of its structure, exceptions, and

modifications of collective bargaining agreement not subject to injunction despite
authorization of modifications by bankruptcy court). This was an issue lurking beneath the
surface of the Hartmarx controversy. The union, attempting to leverage its position with a
strike threat, was seeking a buyer that would recognize it as majority representative of
Hartmarx employees and not make significant modifications to its collective bargaining
agreement with Hartmarx. Even if a buyer agrees to step into the shoes of Hartmarx's
collective bargaining relationship, or assumes its collective bargaining agreement with the
union, the change in ownership may not achieve the union's objective. Hartmarx's buyer
would probably not be precluded from requesting the bankruptcy court to reject the
existing collective bargaining agreement in this or a subsequent bankruptcy case.
17
The complexity of the automakers' deliberations with the Government, for example,
might have generated such a response from the United Autoworkers had those negotiations
been carried out after the bankruptcy petition was filed.
18
See JOHN J. GALLAGHER ET AL., AN UNHAPPY CROSSROADS: THE
INTERPLAY OF BANKRUPTCY AND AIRLINE LABOR LAW Section IV.B (2004).
19
Those cases, which will be discussed at various points throughout the article, are
Elsinore Shore Associates vs. Local 54, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees
International Union, 820 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1987); Briggs Transportation Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 1984) cert denied 469 U.S.
917 (1984); Crowe & Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2, 713
F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983); Petrusch v Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297 (2nd Cir.1981)
cert. denied 456 U.S. 974, 102 S.Ct. 2238, 72 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982).
20
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 42 (1957)
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reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in the Burlington Northern21 case. Part
II of the article discusses the potential for conflict between the NLGA antiinjunction provision and the injunction provisions of the bankruptcy code.
Part III of the article undertakes a theoretical exploration of the potential for
conflict in these seemingly competing provisions.
I.

THE NORRIS-LAGUARDIA ACT
A.

Structure

The Norris LaGuardia Act strictly limits the injunctive authority of the
federal courts. Sections 1 and 2 of the NLGA set out the policy and overall
purpose of the Act:
No court of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict
conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall any such
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued
contrary to the public policy declared in this chapter.22
Section 2 leaves little doubt that Congress intended that courts interpret
the Act liberally in favor of the policy referenced in Section 1, i.e., the
broad protection of employee organization, collective bargaining, and
mutual aid or protection.23
The NLGA unambiguously curtails federal courts’ authority to issue
injunctions in labor disputes, and clearly sets forth a policy protective of
21

Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481
U.S. 429 (1987).
22
29 U.S.C. § 101
23
29 U.S.C. § 102. Section 2 states in relevant part:
. . . [T]he public policy of the United States is declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom
of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is
necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .
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employee rights. Section 4 of the Act additionally declares that during
labor disputes federal injunctions are absolutely prohibited from interfering
with nine separate categories of peaceful employee conduct.24 Of particular
interest, for purposes of this discussion, is the statute's complete removal
from the ambit of federal injunctive authority of peaceful work stoppages,
and giving publicity to a labor dispute in a peaceful, non-fraudulent manner,
including by "patrolling,"25 of the facts surrounding labor disputes.26
Section 7 of the NLGA, however, qualifies that at least some federal
injunctions may issue in labor disputes when "unlawful acts . . . have been
threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed
and will be continued unless restrained."27 Even when injunctions falling
within this exception to the general prohibition are authorized,28 the
complainant must prove additional facts in order to invoke federal
injunctive power. Those facts must show:

24

The categories are set out in Section 4 and include the following employee conduct:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer
organization . . .; (c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in [a] labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or other
moneys or things of value; (d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or
interested in any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State; (e) Giving publicity to the
existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; (f) Assembling
peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their interests in a labor dispute; (g)
Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts
heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in
section 103 of [the Act].
25
Patrolling is essentially communicating a message while in motion.
26
29 U.S.C. § 104(a) and 104(e), respectively; see previous note.
27
29 U.S.C. § 107:
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . .
except after hearing the testimony . . . to the effect . . .(a) That unlawful acts have
been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed
and will be continued unless restrained . . ."
28
The Supreme Court has previously rejected a theory that under the NLGA a Federal
court may issue an injunction to restrain labor activity alleged to be unlawful where the
activity complained of is unaccompanied by fraud or violence. Marine Cooks and
Stewards, AFL v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 371 (1960) ("And even if unlawful, it
would not follow that the federal court would have jurisdiction to enjoin the particular
conduct which s 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act declared shall not be enjoined.").
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[T]hat substantial and irreparable injury to its property would
result in the absence of injunctive relief; that as to each item of relief
granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the
denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting
of relief; that complainant has no adequate remedy at law; that the
public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection . . .29
Section 13 of the Act contains the statute's operative definitions,
explaining when a case involves or grows out of a labor dispute,30 when
persons or associations will be held to be "participating or interested in" a
labor dispute,31 and setting forth the elements of a statutory labor dispute.32
The definitions, even prior to consideration of the Act’s history and context,
reflect a clear Congressional intent to sweep up cases that in almost any
manner involve or grow out of a labor dispute, to create a presumption that
"persons or associations" with even an indirect interest in a labor dispute are
participants covered by the statute, and to include almost all forms of
workplace conflict in the statutory category of "labor dispute.”33
29

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(b)-(e)
29 U.S.C. § 113(a):
[A] case grows out of a labor dispute when [it] the involves persons who are
engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect
interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are
members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees;
whether such dispute is (1) between one or more employers or associations of
employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between
one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers
or associations of employers; or (3) between one or more employees or
associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of
employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a
“labor dispute” (as defined in this section) of “persons participating or interested”
therein (as defined in this section) . . .
31
29 U.S.C. § 113(b):
A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested
in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in
the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has
a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any
association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in
such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
32
29 U.S.C. § 113(c):
The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee.
33
When Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 - a mere three
30
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Critical Historical Background of the NLGA

While the text of the NLGA standing alone clearly establishes that
federal courts are flatly deprived of authority to issue injunctions in labor
disputes, it has nevertheless been questioned whether the breadth of the
exclusion was actually intended by the Congress of 1932. Professor
Thomas Haggard, for example, described the underlying policy of that
legislature as follows:
Congress concluded that the federal judiciary was biased in favor of
management and that courts were abusing their equity powers by
issuing, often on a purely ex parte basis, overly broad injunctions
against strikes and other forms of collective activity by labor
unionists. Moreover, the antitrust and tort doctrines upon which the
courts relied either reflected some of the influence of the old
criminal-conspiracy doctrine or were otherwise regarded as open
ended vehicles through which the courts expressed their
predilections about labor relations and social policy. Nevertheless, at
that time, Congress was allegedly in a laissez faire mood - not yet
willing to legislate affirmatively in favor of labor unions, but also
unwilling to let the courts "legislate" in favor of management.34
Professor Haggard's view is consistent with other commentators who have
tended to suggest that the NLGA was a congressional response primarily
limited to remedying the judicial practice of issuing injunctions in labor
disputes styled, artfully, as antitrust cases.35 However, such an explanation
years following the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act - it defined the term "labor
dispute" in almost identically broad fashion in Section 2(9) of that statute, suggesting that
the sweeping Norris-LaGuardia definition continued to be intended. The common
definition is that a labor dispute "includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."
34

Haggard, Apparent Conflict, at 706, citing 75 CONG. REC. 4915 (1932) (statement
of Sen. Wagner) ("The policy and purpose which gives meaning to the present legislation is
its implicit declaration that the Government shall occupy a neutral position, lending its
extraordinary power neither to those who would have labor unorganized nor to those who
would organize it . . ."); Archibald Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
8 (1960).
35
Haggard, Apparent Conflict, at 714:
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only partly tells the story.
Aggressively ousting federal courts from labor disputes altogether was
the legislative motive behind passage of the Act.36 The NLGA was intended
as a forceful and unequivocal resolution of what the judges, but not
Congress, saw as an ambiguity in the Clayton Act.37 Congress had
previously assumed that the Clayton legislation would utterly strip federal
courts of injunctive authority in labor disputes.38 Even this formulation may
not state the case strongly enough, however. It is not simply that Congress
thought the Clayton Act had been honestly misconstrued. Rather, Congress
-- at least some in Congress39 -- thought the federal judiciary had
deliberately misconstrued the Clayton Act.
The relationship between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the antitrust laws is
unique, and a historical analysis of this relationship indicates that Congress
intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to address union activities, primarily in the
context of those activities' alleged illegality under the antitrust laws.
36

Congress substantially locked out the federal courts from involvement in labor
disputes until the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. But see the discussion infra at
I.C.
37
38 Stat. 730. The Clayton Act, which was passed in 1914, was to remedy the abuses
of the Sherman Act and to exempt labor unions from antitrust laws.
Section 6 of the Clayton Act stated as the policy of the act, "That the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws
shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural and
horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members from such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof; nor shall such
organizations or members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade under the anti-trust laws.." Labor leader Samuel Gompers
hailed the Clayton Act as the laborer's "Magna Charta." Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in
Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 37 N. D. L. Rev. 49 (1961).
The case provoking the NLGA legislative response was Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). In Duplex, a machinists union struck a Michigan-based
manufacturer of printing presses. To enhance the impact of the strike, the union broadened
its appeals to unions and employees in other states where the manufacturer's presses were
sold, thereby generating a secondary boycott. Id. 463-64. The Court concluded that the
anti-injunctive language of the Clayton Act did not extend to secondary boycotts and that
federal courts were accordingly authorized to issue injunctions in such cases. Id. at 478.
38 ARCHIBALD COX, DEREK CURTIS BOK, ROBERT A. GORMAN &
MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 38 (14th Ed.
Foundation Press 2006).
39
Whether the criticism of the Duplex court was entirely fair is another matter, for
there were clearly conflicting statements in the legislative record as to whether the antiinjunction provision of the Clayton Act reached secondary boycotts. Duplex, supra, 254
U.S. at 474-477, especially n.2 (statements of Mr. Webb). The point is that the perception
of a significant portion of the Congress passing the NLGA was that federal judges had
deliberately flouted the Clayton Act.
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Evidence of this more broadly hostile sentiment is the statement of
Representative LaGuardia himself, made during the debate over the bill in
the House of Representatives:
Gentlemen, there is one reason why this legislation [the NorrisLaGuardia Act] is before Congress, and that one reason is
disobedience of the law on the part of whom? On the part of
organized labor? No. Disobedience of the law on the part of a few
Federal judges. If the courts had been satisfied to construe the law as
enacted by Congress, there would not be any need of legislation of
this kind. If the courts had administered even justice to both
employers and employees, there would be no need of considering a
bill of this kind now. If the courts had not emasculated and
purposely misconstrued the Clayton Act, we would not today be
discussing an anti-injunction bill.40
And lest it be thought that the hostility was limited solely to passions
aroused by the alleged misconstruction of the Clayton Act, an arguably
narrow complaint, further examination of the Congressional Record reveals
the breadth of the antipathy:
. . . [T]hese great monopolistic combinations control property
running into the billions in value; and are we going to turn them
over to the tender mercies of a few fellows down in the earth who
are digging coal, and not give them the right to commence in the
Federal courts an action for an injunction to enable them to obtain
their rights? Why, before we get through we will have deprived
these large corporations of their rights under the Constitution; we
will have nullified all the provisions of the Constitution. We ought
to hesitate before we take away from these suffering companies the
blessed right to have an injunction issued by a Federal judge,
holding office for life, who, perhaps, forsooth, has obtained his job
upon the recommendation of the very men and the very corporations
who are asking the injunctions at his hands. We ought to be careful
and see that we do not take away from that judge the right to make
good to those who set him on a pedestal, made him a tyrant for life,
and a monarch of all he surveys. We have got to be careful. 41
These passages leave very little room for doubt of the general
40

Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees, 481 U.S. at 438-39 (1987) citing 75 Cong. Rec. 5478 (emphasis supplied).
41
Statement of Rep. Norris, 75 Cong. Rec. 4938
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antagonism that Congress felt towards the federal judiciary.
A book entitled The Labor Injunction, coauthored by then Harvard law
professor and later Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, and Nathan
Greene, also influenced the Congress of 1932.42 That work broadly alleged
that the federal judiciary had historically relied on an array of ambiguous
legal theories to justify issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, premised
on a variety of substantive areas, including breach of contract43 and
interference with railroad receiverships.44
Frankfurter and Greene’s discussion of the historical role of railroad
receiverships in the courts’ development of a rationale to justify issuing
labor injunctions remains particularly valuable to understanding the policy
of the NLGA. As commentators of the early 1930s were aware, the use of
federal injunctions in labor disputes was first developed in this context.45
42

FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, see supra n.11; see
also Haggard, Apparent Conflict, 706. One commentator has alleged that the personal
biases of Frankfurter & Greene influenced those authors' conclusions. See Petro,
Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932. Part 1. What the Courts Actually Did - and
Why, 14 Wake Forest L. Rev., 341 passim (1978). Even if this were true, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION was nevertheless a primary influence on Congress and is therefore an
indispensable resource for divining congressional intent in enacting the NLGA. For
evidence that the Congress believed the conclusions of Frankfurter and Greene, and a good
deal more, consider the statement of Rep. McGugin made on the House floor on March 8,
1932:
Some day and some time, when the history of this country is written, some
historian will obtain a copy of one of these tyrannical labor injunction decrees and
will point out how far the courts went in excess of their rights and contrary to
human liberty and righteousness. Injunctions enjoining a man from talking to his
neighbor about anything which he may want to discuss, whether it be a strike or a
labor dispute, or what not, is contrary to the true principles of liberty. If there
were not a single laboring man in the United States asking for this bill, we should
curb the power of the courts in granting these injunctions, upon the broad
principle that such injunctions are a menace to liberty. (Applause.) 75 Cong. Rec.
5500
For a general critique of Petro's methods see William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the
Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1250-51 n.61 (1989) [hereinafter Shaping of the
Labor Movement].
43
Frankfurter and Greene, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 39-40. Indeed, the entirety
of Section 3 of the NLGA is devoted to rendering unenforceable in federal courts the
“yellow dog” contract, an agreement between an employer and employee that the employee
would refrain from joining or remaining a member of a union. A union’s alleged
interference with such a contract was one method by which employers had successfully
“federalized” labor disputes, making them susceptible to federal injunction. See e.g.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
44
Id. at 23.
45
See, e.g., Walter Nelles, A Strike and Its Legal Consequences - An Examination of
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The railroad strikes of 1877,46 occurring in the context of such
receiverships,47 were the probable catalyst for the first federal judicial
involvement in labor disputes.48 Frankfurter and Greene alleged, "[i]t was
an easy transition to indulge in [labor] injunctions apart from
receiverships."49 Once federal labor injunctions were permitted in the
railroad receivership context on policy grounds, apparently they were
imported to other contexts.
The receiverships of the 1870s and 1880s differed from bankruptcy.50
However, like bankruptcy, receiverships were a form of corporate
reorganization made necessary by a firm’s extreme financial difficulty.51 As
the Receivership Precedent for the Labor Injunction, 40 Yale L. J. 507 (1930-1931). The
general increase in the issuance of labor injunctions was well underway by 1862. See
Benjamin Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 UCLA L. Rev. 292, 292 n.1
(1963) citing Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 Yale L. J. 825, 833 (1926).
46
Selig Perlman, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES,
Chapter 2:
The strikes of 1877, which on account of the wide area affected, the degree of
violence displayed, and the amount of life and property lost, impressed
contemporaries as being nothing short of social revolution, were precipitated by a
general ten percent reduction in wages on the three trunk lines running West, the
Pennsylvania, the Baltimore & Ohio, and the New York Central, in June and July
1877. This reduction came on top of an earlier ten percent reduction after the
panic. The railway men were practically unorganized so that the steadying
influence of previous organization was totally lacking in the critical situation of
unrest which the newly announced wage reduction created.
The legislative history also shows that the Debs case was also much on the mind of
Congress. See 75 Cong. Rec. 5475 (statement of Mr. Beck).
47
Nelles, Receivership Precedent, 515.
48
Id. at 533.
49
Frankfurter and Greene, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 23. See also Nelles,
Receivership Precedent, at 533 (quoting the contemporaneous advocacy of President Scott
of the Pennsylvania Railroad for general Federal injunctive authority over labor disputes):
It will hardly be contended that the railroad companies must become
bankrupt in order to make secure the uninterrupted movement of traffic
over their lines, or to entitle them to the efficient protection of the United
States government . . .The laws which give the Federal courts the
summary process of injunction to restrain so comparatively trifling a
wrong as infringement of a patent right certainly must have been
intended or ought to give the United States authority to prevent a
wrongdoing which not only destroys a particular road but also paralyzes
the commerce of the country and wastes the national wealth.
50

For one thing, courts of the era were quite willing to take over direct supervision of a
financially ailing railroad. Forbath, Shaping of the Labor Movement at1155 n.196.
51
Nelles, Receivership Precedent, at 515. During the depression of the late 1870s,
"[t]he owners of many Middle Western railways, unable to meet fixed charges, had to call
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in bankruptcy, the state protected the reorganized entity in its formative
stages.52 While somewhat difficult to establish authoritatively, the drafters
of the NLGA must have been aware of the role played by railroad
receiverships in the history of labor injunctions.53 It is unimaginable that
the drafters would have countenanced an exception to their new, broad antiinjunction statute, premised on the notion that courts could be trusted to
engage in business reorganizations unencumbered, as a special case, even in
the context of a labor dispute.54
On the contrary, the legislative history of the NLGA evinces a
widespread, generalized congressional hostility to the federal judiciary that
must not be forgotten when considering questions of legislative intent
surrounding the NLGA.
C.

Judicial and Statutory Exceptions to the Act

In the seventy-seven year history of the NLGA the courts, but not
Congress, have created three exceptions to the statute's anti-injunctive
mandate,55 all of which involve real or perceived conflicts with other labor
statutes.56 Under the first exception, federal courts may issue injunctions to
compel unions and employers to comply with certain duties under the
on the courts to take care of their properties through receivers; some were, others were not,
able to profit by the receivership and reorganization proceedings and find themselves still
in the drivers' seats at their conclusion."
52
Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receiverships and Modern Bankruptcy Theory, 89
Cornell L. Rev. 1420, 1422, n.3 ("Railroad receivership . . . was effectively a private deal
enforced with the power of a federal district court . . .")
53
After all, Felix Frankfurter, whose views on the connection between receiverships
and injunctions have already been discussed, was co-draftsman of the NLGA itself.
William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L. J. 165, 190 (2001).
54
See Richard M. Seltzer & Thomas N. Ciantra, The Return of Government by
Injunction in Airline Bankruptcies, 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 499, 529 (2007) ("[n]o
series of cases contributed more to the feeling that the federal courts abused their equity
jurisdiction than those involving employees of railroads in equity receivership")
[hereinafter Government by Injunction].
55
One might also include the Court's opinion in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). In that case it was held that a union
could be enjoined from striking in defiance of a requirement under the Railway Labor Act
to submit "minor" disputes, as defined by the statute, to a railroad adjustment board. As
Justice Black noted in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 210-211 (1962),
there is clear legislative history showing that Congress intended to forbid unions from
striking in those circumstances when it amended the Railway Labor Act in 1934, in part to
allow for creation of the adjustment board. Id. citing Chicago River, 353 U.S. at 30. In
those circumstances, the argument that the NLGA blanket prohibition on injunctions has
been explicitly rendered inoperable is obviously persuasive.
56
No cases have been located in which a non-labor statute was found to confer
authorization for federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.
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Railway Labor Act. Under the second exception, federal courts possess
authority to issue injunctions to prevent unions from striking over
grievances when a union and employer are contractually bound to arbitrate
the grievance, and the employer is, in fact, prepared to proceed to
arbitration. Under the third exception, federal court injunctions are
explicitly authorized under the Labor Management Relations Act.57
The first exception holds that federal courts may issue injunctions to
compel unions to adhere generally to duties under the Railway Labor Act.
The rule was laid out just that broadly in the Supreme Court's 1971 opinion
Chicago and North Western Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union.58
Though the rule established in Chicago and North Western has been clearly
accepted and is settled, the case was probably wrongly decided. The two
primary cases upon which the Court relied for the general proposition that
labor injunctions were permissible under the Railway Labor Act were far
afield from traditional contests between certified unions and employers
engaged in a labor dispute over terms and conditions of employment.
First, in Virginian Railway Company v. System Federation No. 40,59 the
underlying injunction had been issued to prevent an employer from
continuing to deal with an uncertified union in lieu of the lawfully elected
representative of its employees. The Court gave short shrift to the
employer's argument that the NLGA prevented federal courts from issuing
injunctions barring employers from recognizing unions other than those
officially certified under the Railway Labor Act. The Court noted that the
purpose of the NLGA, as set forth in Section 2, was that employees "shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in selforganization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."60
Second, the Court's reliance on Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Fireman was misplaced.61 In Graham, the Court upheld an injunction that
had been issued to nullify bargaining agreements between a "whites only"
union and a group of southern railroads.62 As the Graham Court carefully
explained:
[T]he Norris-LaGuardia Act did not deprive federal courts of
57

See 29 U.S.C. §160(l). The injunction provisions were initially enacted under the
1947 Taft-Hartley Act, which is now incorporated in the Labor Management Relations Act.
58
402 U.S. 570 (1971)
59
402 U.S. at 581 citing 300 U.S. 515 (1937)
60
Id. at 563
61
402 U.S. at 582 citing 338 U.S. 232 (1949)
62
338 U.S. at 233
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jurisdiction to compel compliance with positive mandates of the
Railway Labor Act . . . enacted for the benefit and protection within
a particular field, of the same groups whose rights are preserved by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. To depart from those views would be to
strike from labor's hands the sole judicial weapon it may employ to
enforce such minority rights as these petitioners assert and which we
have held are now secured to them by federal statute. To hold that
this Act deprives labor of means of enforcing bargaining rights
specifically accorded by the Railway Labor Act would indeed be to
‘turn the blade inward.’63
Thus, the essential rationale in both Virginian Railway and Graham was
purely mechanical: the purpose of neither the NLGA nor the Railway Labor
Act could be achieved unless employees had bona fide unions that did not
discriminate against them on the basis of race, and unless employers were
compelled to negotiate only with unions lawfully selected by employees.
Judicial enforcement through injunction of the conditions precedent for the
procedural operation of the Railway Labor Act was one thing. Judicial
interference with the utilization of economic weapons -- strikes64 and
lockouts65 -- which have been thought integral to American labor law,66 was
quite another. As Justice Brennan emphasized in his dissent in Chicago &
North Western:
. . .[T]he underlying cohesiveness of the decisions lies in the fact
that in each instance the scheme of the Railway Labor Act could not
begin to work without judicial involvement. That is, unless the
unions fairly represented all of their employees; unless the employer
bargained with the certified representative of the employees; unless
63

338 U.S. at 237 citing generally Virginian Railway Company, 300 U.S. 515
There is no universally accepted definition of the term "strike," but for purposes of
discussion this article will make use of the definition under the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 142(2): "The term “strike” includes any strike or other concerted stoppage
of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collectivebargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of
operations by employees."
65
In a lockout, which is in general a lawful economic weapon, an employer prevents
employees from working, either because it anticipates that a strike is about to occur and
wants to control the timing of the work stoppage, or to pressure the union to accept the
employer's bargaining position during negotiations. See DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR
LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 630-33.
66
The famous subsequent case laying out the policy is N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents
International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 495 (1960). In that case, the Court made clear that the
use of economic weapons during bargaining was not a violation of a party’s statutory duty
to bargain in good faith.
64

11-Aug-09]

LABOR INJUNCTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

17

the status quo was maintained during the entire range of bargaining,
the statutory mechanism could not hope to induce a negotiated
settlement. In each case the judicial involvement was minimal and in
keeping with the central theme of the Act-to bring about voluntary
settlement. In each case the ‘collective bargaining agents stepped
outside their legal duties and violated the Act which called them into
being . . . As the statutory machinery nears termination without
achieving settlement, the threat of economic self-help and the
pressures of informed public opinion create new impetus toward
compromise and agreement. If self-help can now effectively be
thwarted by injunction and by drawn-out court proceedings after the
termination of the entire bargaining process, or worse, yet, at each
step thereof, the threat of its use becomes impotent, indeed.67
There are well known limitations in divining congressional intent. It is
nevertheless difficult to agree with the Court that the legislative history of
the NLGA supports the contention that Congress anticipated that employers
could obtain labor injunctions to force unions to comply with duties,
broadly defined, under the Railway Labor Act.68 For purposes of this
67

Chicago & North West Railway Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. at
595 (Brennan, J., Dissenting Opinion).
68
In its curt discussion of the NLGA's legislative history, for example, the Court
omitted the statement of Rep. Steiwer, of Oregon, in connection with a case in which an
injunction had been obtained under the Railway Labor Act. The Court focused on
statements by Rep. Blaine vaguely suggesting that employees would continue to be able to
obtain RLA injunctions to enforce employer compliance under that act notwithstanding
passage of the NLGA as they had in the past. Rep. Steiwer promptly corrected this
contention:
An effective answer can be made to the last suggestion in just one sentence. In the
railway clerks' case there was no unlawful act; there was not even the threat of an
unlawful act. The remedy sought by the employees was based merely upon a
coercion by the employers and the denial of the employees' right to be represented
by agents of their own choosing. If that right is asserted again in a court of the
United States after the enactment of this bill the court cannot issue an injunction in
their behalf, because the jurisdiction of the court will depend upon a finding that
there is an unlawful act or the threat of an unlawful act, and the remedy provided
or implied in the act of 1926, in my humble judgment, will be gone. 75 Cong.
Rec. 4938.
Thus, Rep. Steiwer appeared to assume that federal courts' previously existing
injunctive authority under Railway Labor Act would be undermined and perhaps
eliminated altogether unless a party could make a threshold showing that unlawful acts had
been or were about to be committed. The additional implication of his statement is that
mere noncompliance with a statutory duty would not rise to the level of an unlawful act.
Indeed, the debate during which Steiwer made the remark reflected broad congressional
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discussion, however, it is adequate to say that the cautious use of such
injunctions has been deemed necessary to preserve the design of the railway
labor statute. At this point in the development of labor doctrine,
congressional action would be necessary to alter the cases upholding the
exception. Ultimately, as Professor Gould has put it, "where the RLA was
involved, the Norris-LaGuardia hurdle was not too high for the Court to
jump in order to enjoin a strike."69
The second judicially created exception to the NLGA is the rule that,
where a union has agreed under a collective bargaining agreement not to
strike, presumably in exchange for an employer's agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes, the union ought to be held to its bargain, under the
compulsion of federal injunction if necessary.70 The exception was
established in the Supreme Court's 1970 opinion in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770.71 While also a well-established exception, the
Boys Market exception was also probably wrongly decided, though to little
effect in the face of congressional acquiescence. The problem with this
additional departure from the no-injunction rule is that, despite the existence
in 1932 of collective bargaining agreement no-strike pledges and grievancearbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements,72 Congress failed
to provide for such an exception, and the NLGA's legislative history
provides not a hint that the 72nd Congress would have countenanced such a
sweeping deviation from the statute.
As part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act, however, the Congress provided for breach of collective
bargaining agreement actions in federal court.73 By 1957, the Supreme
concern that unions and employees would lose their apparent ability to compel by
injunction employer compliance with the mandates of the Railway Labor Act. See 75
Cong. Rec.
69
William B. Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions and the Judges: The Boys Market
Case, 1970 Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 220 (1970) [hereinafter On Labor Injunctions]
70
Federal court jurisdiction is conferred in the first instance by Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.
71
398 U.S. 235 (1970). This assumes, of course, that the employer also established the
traditional equitable criteria -- that "breaches [of the collective bargaining agreement] are
occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they
have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will
suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." Id. at
255 citing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962)
72
See e.g. the labor agreement exemplar in WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Protocol
Agreement between Cloak, Suit and Skirt Manufacturers' Protective Association and
Various Labor Unions (1910) (Appendix? to §§ 1664-1656) available at
http://chestofbooks.com/business/law/Law-Of-Contracts-3/index.html (last visited July 11,
2009).
73
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185
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Court had concluded, in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama,74 that creation of an action for breach of an employer's agreement
to arbitrate employment disputes implied that federal courts could issue
preliminary injunctions to compel arbitration in compliance with the
agreement.75 How could the NLGA be read to permit the issuance of such
an injunction? According to the Court it was because "[t]he failure to
arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was
aimed."76 Furthermore, Congress wanted to encourage the making of
collective bargaining agreements with no-strike agreements and arbitration
was the quid pro quo for such an agreement.77
Naturally enough, if an employer could be compelled by injunction to
comply with its collectively bargained agreement to arbitrate employment
disputes, the argument that unions could analogously be enjoined to comply
with its no-strike pledge under the same agreement would not be long in
coming.
Five years later, Sinclair Refining v. Atkinson presented the question.78
In Sinclair, it was alleged that a union engaged in a series of work
stoppages, during roughly a year and a half period, concerning a dispute
that was arbitrable under the effective collective bargaining agreement
between the union and the employer. 79 The employer sought an injunction
to suspend the work stoppages and the accompanying picketing.80 A federal
district court in Indiana dismissed a motion for equitable relief on the theory
that the NLGA forbade injunctions to issue in connection with the peaceful
labor activity complained of, and the Seventh Circuit upheld the order of
dismissal.81
In affirming the decision of the Seventh Circuit, Justice Black, writing
for the majority, made two essential arguments. First, he contended that

74

353 U.S. 448 (1957)
Id. at 457-58.
76
Id. The Court immediately acknowledged that its conclusion could not be squared
with the text of the NLGA. Id.
77
Id. at 453-55. Section 8 of the NLGA states that injunctions may not issue in favor
of "any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is
involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort
to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental
machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration." The Court read the section as a general
endorsement of the voluntary settlement of labor disputes. Id. at 458. Of course, the
argument is somewhat misplaced because it was the union not the employer seeking the
injunction.
78
370 U.S. at 195; see supra at n.64
79
Id. at 197
80
Id.
81
Id. at 198
75
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nothing in the language of Section 301 suggested a repeal of the NLGA.82
The legislative history, moreover, showed that Congress had explicitly
considered and rejected the notion, during the Taft-Hartley debates, whether
those amendments would repeal the NLGA.83
Second, Justice Black argued that Lincoln Mills merely stood for the
proposition that parties who had agreed under the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to submit grievances to arbitration could be
compelled to do so. The Court had not held, according to Justice Black,
that federal injunctions could issue to halt protected labor activity, nor, he
argued, would it have been proper to do so in light of the "overwhelming
evidence of a congressional intent to retain completely intact the antiinjunction prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in suits brought under s
301."84 For him, therefore, it was clear that, "[a]n injunction against work
stoppages, peaceful picketing or the nonfraudulent encouraging of those
activities would . . . prohibit the precise kinds of conduct which subsections
(a), (e) and (i) of [§] 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act unequivocally say
cannot be prohibited."85
Boys Markets, which in 1970 authorized issuance of federal court
injunctions to suspend strikes over disputes concerning which the employer
and union had agreed to arbitrate,86 cannot to this day be persuasively
reconciled with the Court's 1962 Sinclair opinion. Congress had not
intervened in the eight year interval between the cases, and it is obvious that
the Court had simply utilized "strong judicial creativity in the face of the
plain meaning of Section 4 . . . "87 Whatever one's views of the need for
such judicial activism given the state of the law in 1970,88 however, the
82

Id. at 204-205
Sinclair Refining, 370 U.S. at 210.
84
Id. at 210-212
85
Id. at 212
86
A subsequent refinement of the rule is that a federal court may not enjoin a strike in
violation of a no-strike agreement where the underlying dispute is not covered by the
applicable collective bargaining agreement. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) (holding that sympathy strike not enjoinable under the
NLGA because underlying dispute concerned union and employer not in collective
bargaining relationship and thus not arbitrable because no contract between parties). Thus,
by 1976 the Court had begun to inch away from the theoretical outer boundary of the proarbitration position that, in effect, would have prevented unions from striking even in
situations when arbitrations could not resolve the underlying dispute.
87
See Archibald Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
Rocky Mntn L. Rev. 247, 256 (1957)
88
Professor Atleson has argued that Boys Market rests on a shaky doctrinal foundation
despite being a logical outgrowth of Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy (United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)) (establishing the centrality of arbitration to federal labor
83
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exception was palpably devised paying the closest attention to the
competing labor policies at play.
Unlike the situation under the Railway Labor Act and Boys Market
exceptions to the NLGA, there is no question that Congress, in enacting the
Taft-Hartley Act,89 authorized and intended federal courts to issue
injunctions in circumstances that the NLGA previously would have
classified as unenjoinable labor disputes.90 However, the authorization is
limited to certain well-defined categories.91 The best known of these
categories is the secondary boycott,92 but others also exist.93 Taft-Hartley
policy). Moreover, his critique continues, while unions may agree to no-strike provisions,
they would typically not also agree to waive the protections of the NLGA. For Professor
Atleson, Boys Market is ultimately explained by "freewheeling judicial policy making and
not legislative intent . . ." See James B. Atleson, The Circle of Boys Market: A Comment
on Judicial Inventiveness, 7 Indus. Rel. L. J. 88, 105-106 (1985) [hereinafter Circle of Boys
Market]. Commentators such as Professors Gould and Cox, on the other hand, have seen in
Boys Market, “. . . an exception [to Norris-LaGuardia] for strikes in breach of contract
[that] would carry out fairly specific legislative enactment without inviting judicial
determination of labor policy." See Gould, On Labor Injunctions, at 236 quoting Archibald
Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY, 48-52 (1960). Whatever view one
adopts, the debate arises in the context of whether the decision contributed to the
formulation of a coherent labor policy. Assumed, sub silentio, was the existence of a
strong union movement able to achieve collective bargaining agreements in the first
instance. See e.g. Gould, On Labor Injunctions at 236.
That assumption has been seriously undermined for at least the last decade. See
Catherine R. Fisk, Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free
Choice Act, Louisiana L. Rev. (forthcoming) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410220
citing John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union
Organizing Drives, 1999- 2004 62 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 5 (2008) (between 1999
and 2004, of 8,155 newly-certified unions, 44 percent failed to secure a first contract within
a year of certification); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, NO HOLDS BARRED: THE
INTENSIFICATION OF EMPLOYER OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING, EPI Briefing
Paper # 235 (Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, May 20, 2009), p. 22 & Figure
B, available at http://epi.3cdn.net/edc3b3dc172dd1094f_0ym6ii96d.pdf (analyzing a survey
of NLRB elections from 1999-2003, 52 percent of newly certified unions have not secured
a contract one year after election, 37 percent have no contract after two years, 30 percent
have no contract after three years, and 25 percent have no contract more than 3 years postelection).
89
For a penetrating account of the policy considerations underlying the Taft-Hartley
Act see Archibald Cox, Revision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 55 W. Va. L. Rev. 91, 95-97
(1953).
90
For a sympathetic account of the Taft-Hartley injunction provisions by the then
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board see Robert N. Denham, The Taft
Hartley Act, 20 Tenn. L. Rev. 168, 175-76 (1948) [hereinafter Taft-Hartley].
91
The Taft-Hartley Act is an excellent example of Congress's ability to express a
careful and precise authorization of labor injunctions when it actually intends to do so.
92
The term secondary boycott refers to "[r]efusal to work for, purchase from or handle
products of secondary employer with whom union has no dispute, with object of forcing
such employer to stop doing business with primary employer with whom union has
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actually inaugurated the present requirement that the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, but not individuals, seek an injunction
when an expedited investigation reveals that unions have engaged in certain
types of proscribed conduct.94
Taken together, the Railway Labor Act, Boys Markets, and Taft-Hartley
exceptions to the NLGA's anti-injunction provisions must be understood as
a complex judicial and legislative enterprise to harmonize various federal
labor laws into a coherent national labor policy.
D.

A Brake on NLGA "Labor Policy" Exception:
The Burlington Northern Case

The logic of the harmonization of federal labor law, if unconstrained,
might have overwhelmed the anti-injunctive policy of the NLGA despite its
statutory text. Analysts unfamiliar with the subtlety and history of the labor
laws might be tempted to conclude that the federal courts in cases like Boys
Market had simply abandoned the NLGA as "a statute for other times and
other circumstances."95
The Supreme Court checked the potential for unbridled harmonization
in its opinion in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance
dispute." C. Comella, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 33 Ohio App. 61, 72 (1972).
93
See generally the current catalogue at 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4). Indeed, one of the
strongest arguments against the Boys Market outcome is that Congress, while hard at work
about the business of establishing federal court injunctive authority as an aid to
enforcement of newly devised union unfair labor practices, declined to explicitly relax the
injunction prohibitions in Section 4 of the NLGA. At the same time, Congress did amend
portions of Section 6 of the NLGA, and failed to accept a House provision that would have
made Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable to Section 301. See Atleson, Circle of Boys Market at
93 citing H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947). It seems wholly inescapable
that the Boys Market policy was entirely a judicial creation.
94
See 29 U.S.C. §160(b)(l). As the NLRB General Counsel at the time described it,
injunctions were required to be sought:
. . . where a labor organization has called a strike or has encouraged the
employees of any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle, or to work on, any goods or commodities, or to perform any services, in
order to force an employer to join some trade association or employer
organization; Or, to force an employed person to join a labor organization; Or, to
force any employer or other person to stop handling, using, or selling the products
of some other producer or manufacturer, or to stop doing business with any other
person; Or, where the object is to force an employer other than their own to
recognize an uncertified labor organization as the representative of his employees;
Or, to force an employer to recognize or bargain with some particular labor
organization when his employees are already represented by a certified union . . .
Denham, Taft-Hartley at 175.
95
Haggard, Apparent Conflict at 740
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and Way Employees.96 In that case, the Court was presented with a golden
opportunity to hasten abandonment of the NLGA, if that had been the intent
of the federal judiciary. The union, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employees, represented railroad employees of the Maine Central
Railroad and the Portland Terminal Company, subsidiaries of Guilford
Transportation Industries.97 Guilford owned two other railroads, the
Delaware Hudson Railway Company, and the Boston and Maine
Corporation.98 The Guilford system, which operated in the northeastern
United States, was relatively small, and the company relied on other
railroads to carry much of its traffic.99 The union and Guilford became
embroiled in a dispute over a reduction in the work force.100 The Railway
Labor Act required the parties, as a matter of law, to engage in extensive
negotiations in an attempt to resolve the dispute.101 At the conclusion of the
mandated negotiations, however, the union was free to strike, and it did so,
beginning in March 1986.102
Up to this point, the labor dispute involved relatively standard issues
under the Railway Labor Act. However, the union eventually determined
the strike to be of only limited efficacy in impacting Guilford's operations.
Accordingly, the union decided to widen the dispute, first by picketing other
Guilford subsidiaries, and then by picketing unaffiliated railroad companies
throughout the U.S. that were not involved in the dispute.103 Eventually,
several of these uninvolved companies, including Burlington Northern,
obtained injunctions in a federal district court against the picketing.104 That
court acknowledged that Sections 1 and 4 of the NLGA would bar federal
courts from issuing injunctions against secondary activity growing out of
any labor dispute, but found the sections inapplicable because the dispute
between the uninvolved companies and the union was not a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of the NLGA.105 The court reasoned that this was so
because the uninvolved companies were not "aligned" with Guilford.106
Alternatively, the district court ruled that it had jurisdiction to issue an
96

481 U.S. 429
Id. at 432
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
481 U.S. at 432.
103
Id. at 433. According to the Court, the union erroneously believed some of these
uninvolved companies to be assisting Guilford by lending them equipment and operating
personnel.
104
Id. at 434.
105
See supra n.48.
106
Id. at 434-35.
97
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injunction because the union's activity violated the Interstate Commerce Act
and was therefore "unlawful" within the meaning of the NLGA.107
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion
that the union's labor activity was subject to injunction because the activity
was "unlawful,"108 reasoning that,109 “the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on
federal injunctions is not lifted because the conduct of the union is unlawful
under some other, non-labor statute.”110
The Supreme Court, in addition to upholding the conclusions of the
Seventh Circuit, focused its discussion on whether secondary
picketing111was unlawful under the Railway Labor Act, agreeing with the
Seventh Circuit's conclusion that it was not, and with the circuit's additional
observation that federal courts would in any event be without jurisdiction to
enjoin the picketing, even if it violated a non-labor statute.112
Burlington Northern's significance is that the Supreme Court refused to
read an additional exception into the NLGA even when it could easily have
done so. After all, argued the employer-petitioners,113 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act in 1947 and 1959 had evinced an
unmistakable congressional policy to outlaw secondary boycotts under that
statute.114 Given the silence of the Railway Labor Act respecting secondary
107

Id. at 435. It will be recalled that under Section 107 of the NLGA "unlawful"
conduct subjects a labor dispute to injunction under tight procedural constraints. See supra
n.27, 28 and accompanying text. The District Court made additional RLA-centered
arguments in support of an injunction that have been omitted because they are not germane
to the present discussion.
108
Id.
109
793 F.2d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 1986)
110
481 U.S. at 435 citing Telegraphers v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330, 339
(1960). This is important in considering whether the NLGA's ban on injunctions would be
lifted because the conduct of the union was arguably subject to injunction under the
Bankruptcy Code, another non-labor statute.
111
Picketing is “secondary” when directed against employers who are "neutral" in a
labor dispute. Secondary picketing is generally unlawful under the National Labor
Relations Act. The Railway Labor Act, however, is silent with respect to secondary labor
conduct. As the Seventh Circuit explained:
While the Railway Labor Act's processes continue, no one may use economic
self-help. Those who violate this rule may be enjoined . . . Once these processes
are over, and a strike has lawfully begun, the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids resort
to injunctions.
112
481 U.S. at 435.
113
Petitioner's Brief at 33-34, 1986 WL 727879 (chronicling the legislative history of
both the Taft-Hartley Act, and the later Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, as expressing a desire to abolish the secondary boycott).
114
In reality, however:
The NLRA does not contain a “sweeping prohibition” of secondary activity;
instead it describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific
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boycotts,115 the general policy of that statute in seeking to avoid work
stoppages,116 and the apparent disdain of Congress for secondary boycotts
generally, could not an injunction issue in the interest of harmonizing
federal labor policy? The Court would not, however, go this far in the name
of harmonization, rejecting the invitation (in language evocative of an
earlier period):
Even if we were confident that our mixture of metaphysics and
social policy, unlike that of our predecessors earlier in this century,
would produce a construction of § 13(c) that would substantially
align with Congress' contemporary views, the fact remains that
Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act to forestall judicial
attempts to narrow labor's statutory protection.117
The contrast between Justice Brennan's Burlington Northern opinion in
1987 and his Boys Market opinion in 1970 is remarkable. In Boys Market,
Justice Brennan had said:
As labor organizations grew in strength and developed toward
maturity, congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the
nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective
bargaining and to administrative techniques for the peaceful
resolution of industrial disputes. This shift in emphasis was
accomplished, however, without extensive revision of many of the
older enactments, including the anti-injunction section of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Thus it became the task of the courts to
accommodate, to reconcile the older statutes with the more recent
ones.118
Thus, in the 17-year interval between Boys Market and Burlington
objectives . . . Moreover, the NLRA does not permit employers to seek injunctions
against the activity that it does prohibit. It grants to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) exclusive authority to seek injunctions against some forms of
secondary activity.
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance and Way Employees,
481 U.S. at 448 (internal citations omitted)
115

Id. at 448-49
Id. at 450
117
Id. at 443. It had been argued that the union did not have a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of Section 13(c) of the NLGA with the secondary employers because those
employers were not substantially aligned with the primary employer. Id. at 440-41.
118
Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. at 251.
116
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Northern, Justice Brennan appeared to have abruptly changed position
concerning the NLGA. In Boys Market he saw the NLGA as an older labor
statute that had to be accommodated -- to its detriment -- with newer labor
statutes. In Burlington Northern, however, he reassessed the NLGA as a
directive of an earlier Congress that could not simply be disregarded.119
This view was much more in line with his dissenting opinion in Chicago &
North West Railway, which had articulated a position far less friendly to the
notion of NLGA accommodation.120
The rationale for the change in the Court's tone in Burlington Northern
provides at least some sense as to how federal courts might evaluate
conflicts between the NLGA and non-labor statutes, including the
Bankruptcy Code. Commentators evaluating the NLGA as anachronistic, or
at least not well harmonized, have often pointed to either the strength of
labor unions compared to the early 1930s, or to the judiciary's successes in
building a national labor system founded on arbitration instead of the
utilization by unions and employers of economic weapons like strikes and
lockouts.121 The Burlington Northern case may one day be seen as a
harbinger of the view that those rationales for relaxing the NLGA, to the
extent they were in fact controlling,122 have themselves become
anachronistic.

119

This is not to suggest that Burlington Northern has completely resolved the
question of federal injunctions in Railway Labor Act secondary boycott scenarios,
however. Courts have, for example, issued injunctions against sympathy strikes of a
secondary employer when a striking union had an explicit no-strike agreement with the
primary employer; and have also issued injunctions on the theory that a union striking
against a secondary employer was embroiled in a "minor dispute," triggering mandatory
statutory pre-strike negotiation. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the
Airlines: The Railway Labor Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1485, 1486
n.6 (1990).
120
See generally supra n.73 and accompanying text.
121
For an extremely articulate argument along these lines see Gould, On Labor
Injunctions at 236 (arguing that exceptions to the NLGA were justifiable because of the
improved position of unions in the United States); see also William C. Campbell II., Statute
Note, Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act: A Statute Whose Time Has Come and Gone,
3 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 207, 209 (1980) (arguing that Norris-LaGuardia less necessary
because congressional emphasis has shifted from "protection of the unions to the
encouragement of collective bargaining as a means of peaceful resolution of labor
disputes"); Poe, Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, at 327-28 ("With the rise of organized labor,
congressional labor policy concerns have moved gradually away from protecting workers
and preserving the integrity of the federal judiciary, and have moved toward encouraging
the use of arbitration and other procedures that insure the quick resolution of labor disputes
and the maintenance of industrial peace"); Haggard, Apparent Conflict at 740 (arguing that
the NLGA is "a historical anomaly and an anachronism")
122
Boys Markets, supra n.127 and accompanying text;
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POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT BETWEEN NLGA ANTIINJUNCTIVE PROVISIONS AND BANKRUPTCY
INJUNCTIONS

In order for the NLGA’s anti-injunction provisions to conflict with the
Bankruptcy Code, the Code would have to authorize injunctions with the
capacity for interfering with or suspending NLGA-protected conduct.123
A.

Bankruptcy Code Injunctions

The Bankruptcy Code possesses two types of injunctive vehicles with
the potential for conflicting with the NLGA, the "automatic stay," and a
broad, traditional injunctive provision under section 105 of the Code.
1.

The Automatic Stay

The automatic stay provision of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, applicable to most bankruptcies, automatically
attaches upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and forbids creditors from
unilaterally initiating post-petition debt recovery actions in eight separate
categories.124 Section 362(b), in turn, sets forth specific exceptions to the
123

The NLGA does not explicitly define the term "injunction." It states without
additional explanation, in Section 101 of the Act, that "[n]o court of the United States . . .
shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the
provisions of [the NLGA]; nor shall any such restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in [the NLGA]." Bankruptcy
courts are exclusively federal, In re Lowenbraun, 453 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2006)
("Congress intended for the Code to be comprehensive and for the federal courts to have
exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters"), so any Code injunction would be issued
by a "court of the United States."
124
The automatic stay operates as an immediate stay of: the commencement or
continuation of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the case’s commencement, or to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case; the enforcement,
against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the
commencement of the case; any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate; any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate; any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the
extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case; any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case; the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and the
commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning the debtor. 11 U.S.C. §362(a) (1)-(8).
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stay.125 Assuming for the sake of argument that NLGA-protected conduct
fell within the ambit of Section 362(a), the question is whether an automatic
stay is an injunction within the meaning of the NLGA. If the stay is an
injunction, conflict with the NLGA arises arguably the moment it attaches.
If, on the other hand, the stay is not an injunction, the NLGA is simply
inapplicable.
Professor Haggard has argued that, because the automatic stay is selfenforcing, the anti-injunction provisions of the NLGA do not come into
play.126 This has surface appeal. Because a plaintiff does not initiate the
stay, no federal court is required to respond to a prayer for equitable relief,
and there is no corresponding need for the kind of equitable proceeding
eschewed by the architects of the NLGA. However, this theory contains at
least two problems.
First, as Justice Alito explained in a different context, both statutes and
judicial opinions have used the terms "stay" and "injunction" almost
interchangeably.127 This interchangeability, which has extended to the
bankruptcy context,128 coupled with the NLGA's inclusion of the imprecise
term "restraining orders"129 in the short list of proscribed equitable
remedies, makes it difficult to rely solely on the NLGA's text for a
resolution of the issue.130 Thus, as an interpretive matter Professor
125

The filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate as a stay of the commencement
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against a debtor or of the commencement
or continuation of a civil action or proceeding for the establishment of paternity; the
establishment or modification of an order for domestic support obligations; concerning
child custody or visitation; for the dissolution of a marriage except concerning the division
of property that is property of the estate; regarding domestic violence; of the collection of a
domestic support obligation from property that is not property of the estate; with respect to
the withholding of income that is property of the estate or property of the debtor for
payment of a domestic support obligation under a judicial or administrative order or a
statute; of the withholding, suspension, or restriction of a driver’s license, a professional or
occupational license, or a recreational license, under State law; of the reporting of overdue
support owed by a parent to any consumer reporting agency; of the interception of a tax
refund; or of the enforcement of a medical obligation, as specified under the Social
Security Act. 11 U.S.C. §§362(b)(1) and 362(b)(2)(A)-(G).
126
Haggard, Apparent Conflict at 719 and n.98 citing In re Tom Powell & Son, Inc.,
22 B.R. 657 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
127
Nken v. Holder, -- U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 1766 (2009) (Alito, J., Dissenting)
128
Jove Eng'g Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996) (describing automatic
stay as "essentially a court ordered injunction")
129
See U.S. v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing
possible definitions of term "restraining order" which "could refer either to a temporary
restraining order or, more generally, to other forms of injunctive relief")
130
Courts have at best glossed the issue, possibly because the parties before them have
been confused about which injunctive procedure to pursue. In the underlying bankruptcy
proceeding in Petrusch, for example, the employer-debtor sought a preliminary injunction
against union picketing, under Section 105 of the Code, at the same time the bankruptcy

11-Aug-09]

LABOR INJUNCTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY

29

Haggard's argument fails because without contextual legislative or judicial
definition it is necessary to conclude that a stay is equivalent to an
injunction.
Second, the automatic stay is not really self-enforcing in the way that
Professor Haggard suggests. “Enforcement” means to “constrain,”
“compel” or “carry out effectively."131 But enforcement is not automatic;
an actor is presumed. A violation of the stay is a contempt of court
subjecting the violator to potentially severe sanction132 if the court is
informed of the alleged violation. When (and if) the court is so informed, a
finding of contempt may follow. The situation is barely distinguishable
from the need for a party to notify a court that an injunction has been
violated:133 a court grants an injunction; an alleged violation of the
injunction generates a hearing;134 a finding of violation results in
sanctions.135 Neither the sanction for violation of an injunction nor the
imposition of penalties for violation of an automatic stay is self-enforcing.
In reality, an automatic stay is a recent statutory version of the historical
in rem injunction, an instantly attaching court order that "the whole world"
judge signed an order for the union to show cause why it should not be held in contempt for
violating the Section 362 automatic stay. 14 B.R. 825, 827. The injunction was granted,
and in the preliminary hearing that followed the parties appeared genuinely confused about
what action was to be argued. Id. at 825, n.1. Because the preliminary injunction was
granted, there was no occasion to discuss the whether the automatic stay fell within NLGA,
since the §105 injunction obviously did. The bankruptcy court in Tom Powell, Inc., 22
B.R. 657, had before it a case arising solely under Section 362 when it issued a show cause
order in connection with a strike without an accompanying injunction. Id. While
distinguishing the case from prior similar cases in which injunctions had issued, Id. at 660,
the court did not explicitly consider whether an automatic stay was an NLGA injunction.
The court proceeded to balance of "the policy considerations underlying the prohibitions
against self-help and preferences contained in the Code against the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act," ultimately finding it unnecessary to choose
between the policies because the union had not had actual notice of the stay. Id.
131
MERRIAM
WEBSTER’S
ONLINE
DICTIONARY
available
at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enforcement (last visited August 10, 2009).
132
In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990). While it is true that a debtor must
prove a willful violation of the stay to establish entitlement to damages, see Tom Powell &
Son, Inc. v. 22 B.R. 657, willfulness means acting in violation of the stay with knowledge
that a bankruptcy petition has been filed, not that a creditor intended to violate the stay. In
re Atlantic Business and Community Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990). Willful
violations of the automatic stay require a court to award compensatory damages, including
costs and attorneys fees, and authorize a court to award, in appropriate cases, punitive
damages. Id. at 328 citing 11 U.S.C. §362(h).
133
"Any in personam order that is enforceable by contempt power is an injunctive
order . . . Even the automatic stay in bankruptcy operates like an injunction." DAN B.
DOBBS, THE LAW OF REMEDIES 162 (West Publishing Co. 2nd ed. 1993).
134
See generally Fed. R. Bankrpt. P. 9014
135
See generally Fed. R. Bankrpt. P. 9020
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may not interfere with property that is in the custody of a court.136 In rem
injunctions outside of the bankruptcy context, though probably
constitutionally permissible,137 have met with continuous and fundamental
criticism for failing to provide actual notice to alleged violators of a
contempt proceeding, and for, in effect, delegating to courts of equity the
power to make criminal law.138
Within the bankruptcy context, the restraint of the automatic stay is
imposed instantly, without hearing, and the burden is in effect shifted to the
alleged contemnor to establish that the stay should not have been
imposed.139 The automatic stay is arguably more restrictive than an
injunction, for there is no opportunity to argue that it should not be
imposed. In practical effect it is a legislatively devised ex parte injunction.
The legislative history of the NLGA does not reveal any discussion of
whether an automatic stay qualifies as an "injunction" or a "restraining
order;" it does not discuss the automatic stay at all. This is hardly surprising
since the automatic stay, as it presently exists, had not been created in the
early 1930s.140 Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept that a legislature with
the "federal judges out" outlook of the 72nd Congress would have excluded
such a sweeping instrumentality from the anti-injunction provisions of the
136

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 837-38 (Aspen
Publishers, 3d. ed. 2002).
137
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Association, 443 U.S. 658, 692 n.32 (1978)
138
Doug Rendleman, Beyond Contempt: Obligors to Injunctions, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 873,
911-13 (1975).
139
11 U.S.C. §362(d): "On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing
the court shall grant relief" for three statutory reasons, including a broad, "for cause" safehaven in subsection 1. One nettlesome problem is how to define "party in interest." At
least one Federal Circuit has narrowly defined a "party in interest" subject to relief from an
automatic stay as a creditor entitled to a cash distribution from the bankruptcy estate. In re
Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573 (2d. Cir. 1983). It is not clear whether a union
representing employees would satisfy this definition and, if it would not, how it could gain
relief from a stay. Automatic stay litigation is expedited and courts are expected to hear
and decide issues within 30 days of a request for relief from the stay. 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 362-109 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Summer, eds., Matthew Bender &
Co. 2004).
140
The first statutory automatic stay of any variety was designed "to protect farmers
with respect to secured debt." Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U.
Mich. J. L. Reform 175, 179 (1978). [hereinafter, Automatic Stay I]. The subsequent
history of the stay involves a patchwork of provisions found in various statutory
enactments and sections of judicial Codes. An automatic stay applying broadly across the
bankruptcy statute did not make its appearance until the broad bankruptcy revisions
culminating in the 1978 Act. Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New
Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 1, 4-5 (1978) [hereinafter Automatic Stay II]
(discussing the policy underpinnings of the stay and its historical evolution).
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NLGA.141
The argument that an automatic stay is not an injunction within the
meaning of the NLGA does not, therefore, withstand scrutiny.
2.

Section 105 Injunctions

Assessing the other major injunctive provision of the Bankruptcy Code
presents no similar difficulty. Section 105 states in relevant part:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an
issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the
court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process.142
This is clearly a broad equitable provision that, unlike the automatic
stay, is enabled only upon application to a federal court. The extent of the
breadth of §105 has been a subject occasioning debate. Two schools of
thought compete in this regard.143 One view, drawing on the statutory
language, holds that Section 105 is limited to carrying out the provisions of
the Code.144 Another view holds that courts may apply a liberal reading of
the section, and are authorized to independently identify objectives of the
entire Code, and to take all necessary actions consistent with those
objectives.145 The latter view obviously carries the greatest potential for
141

In any event, the authority for judicial injunction or attachment of a debtor's
property upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition did exist and had since at least the early
part of the 20th century. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 US. 1, 14 (1902). Whether Congress
knew this is, of course, difficult or impossible know. But that is precisely why the
complete divestiture is dramatic. As if to hammer home the point
142
11 U.S.C. §105(a)
143
For discussions bringing great clarity of exposition of these views see Joshua M.
Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the
Debate over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 Emory Bankr. Dev.
J. 13, 37-41 (2006); Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power
under Section 105 of the Code: The All Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief Justice
Marshall, 35 Ariz. St. L. J. 793, 802-804 (2003) [hereinafter Resisting the Expansion of
Bankruptcy Court Power].
144
See e.g. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988)
(explaining that the equitable powers possessed by a bankruptcy court do not extend
beyond the express provisions of the Code).
145
Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Power at 802.
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engendering conflict with the NLGA. A bankruptcy court holding the view
would presumably deem itself more at liberty to balance the equities in a
post-bankruptcy petition labor dispute in favor of bankruptcy policies.
B. Conflict Triggers
Accordingly, the injunctive provisions of the Code carry the structural
potential for conflicting with the NLGA’s anti-injunctive mandate. The
question remains, however, whether labor-factual situations could actually
trigger conflict with the Code.146 Various scenarios raising the conflict
seem plausible.
For example, if, after a bankruptcy petition has been filed, employees
peacefully picket, strike, or leaflet their bankrupt employer to protest some
aspect of their employment relationship, they may be engaging in an “act to
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
[employer],”147 or in an “act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
[employer] that arose before the commencement of the case . . .”148
triggering an arguable breach of the automatic stay.
Imagine a second example in which employees of a bankrupt employer
engage in a post-petition strike, picketing, or leafleting for a pay raise. The
raise may not have been agreed to by the employer, or even discussed by
the parties, prior to the filing of the petition. In those circumstances, the
labor activity might be viewed as an "act to obtain possession of property . .
.," within the meaning of Section 362(a)(3).149 On the other hand, the
employer might have promised the union prior to the filing of the petition
that it would provide a raise, within a collective bargaining agreement or
otherwise, in which case striking or picketing to obtain the raise might be
deemed by a bankruptcy court an "act to collect . . . a claim . . . that arose
before the commencement of the case . . .”150
Some disputes may be even more purely contractual in nature. For
example, a bankrupt employer might refuse to make contributions to
employee benefit funds that were required under the collective bargaining

146

It might, of course, be argued that underlying bankruptcy violations render
attendant peaceful labor activity "unlawful" such that the NLGA itself would authorize
injunctive relief, with procedural restrictions. 29 U.S.C. §107(a). However, as previously
stated, conduct is not unlawful, within the meaning of the NLGA, simply because it
violates another non-labor statute. Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 435; see also Crowe &
Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2, 713 F.2d at 214
147
11 U.S.C.A. 362(a)(3).
148
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(6)
149
See supra n.124.
150
Id.
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agreement in effect when the bankruptcy petition was filed. 151 As in the
case of the hypothetical raise that was not provided, a strike or picketing to
compel the contributions might even more persuasively be deemed "an act
to collect . . . a claim . . . that arose before the commencement of the case. .
."152
How could peaceful labor activity such as strikes and picketing fit
within the Code in these ways? First, the Code defines property very
broadly,153 and "[t]he stay applies to tangible and intangible property."154 A
raise would have to be paid out of the debtor’s “property.” Second, an “act
to obtain possession of” or to “exercise control of” property155 can consist
of seemingly innocuous conduct. For example, telephone calls and letters
merely requesting payment from a debtor have been found sufficient
“harassment” to violate the automatic stay.156 The heated atmosphere of a
labor dispute would not, of course, mesh well with such gentility.157
Picketers shouting, screaming, and cursing, while demanding a raise in pay,
could well be deemed to be engaging in prohibited “acts” under court
interpretations of the Code. A strike with the same aim also seems to fit
within the expansive definition of “acts.”158
Similar considerations apply with respect to an "act to collect . . . a
claim . . . that arose before the commencement of the case . . .”159 The
definitional breadth of “act” has already been discussed. The Code’s
151

See Crowe & Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2, 713
F.2d 211 (striking during bankruptcy over delinquent contribution to employee benefit
funds); Petrusch v Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297 (picketing during bankruptcy over
delinquent contribution to employee benefit funds)
152
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(6)
153
See 11 U.S.C. §541(1): "The commencement of a case . . .creates an estate . .
.comprised of all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case." It is interesting to note that pre-petition amounts withheld by
an employer from employees' wages, or received by an employer directly from employees,
to make contributions to employee benefit plans, deferred compensation plans, certain tax
deferred annuities and certain health plans are not "property" within the meaning of §541.
11 U.S.C. §541(b)(7)(A) and (B).
154
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362-21
155
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(3)
156
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY at 362-33
157
“[F]ederal law gives a union license to use intemperate, abusive, or insulting
language without fear of restraint or penalty if it believes such rhetoric to be an effective
means to make its point.” Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974).
158
Prohibited under §362(a)(3) are acts to obtain any property owned by the debtor,
not simply property that was owned or in the possession of the debtor when the petition
was filed, and that has consequently become part of the bankruptcy estate. 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 362-20
159
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(6)
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definition of “claim” is equally broad. Under the Code a “claim” is defined
as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured . . .”160 Thus, employees
asserting a "claim" for an employer's compliance with its pre-petition
promises by the “act” of striking, picketing, or engaging in any other
peaceful labor conduct could run afoul of this standard.161
III.

EVALUATION OF THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE
NLGA AND BANKRUPTCY INJUNCTIONS

An overall evaluation of the interplay between the NLGA's antiinjunction mandates and Bankruptcy Code injunctions will first assess
judicial treatment of the doctrinal intersection. Beyond what the judges
have had to say in the context of statutory construction, a more robust
consideration of policy questions will be undertaken. First, the full scope of
NLGA policies will be taken into account. Second, the extent to which
bankruptcy injunctions' interference with labor protest could impinge on
employees' First Amendment rights will be considered. Finally, real
differences between labor and bankruptcy policies respecting the possible
injury to reorganizing entities will be explicitly explored.
A.

Judicial Precedent and Statutory Construction

The Circuit Courts that have considered whether bankruptcy courts may
issue injunctions against peaceful labor activity during post-bankruptcy
petition labor disputes have uniformly concluded that they may not.162 Of
the non-Railway Labor Act bankruptcy cases decided in the circuits, none
appear to have held that an automatic stay or Section 105 injunction could
supersede the injunctive strictures of the NLGA.163 The courts' rationales
for coming to the conclusion, taken together, have been somewhat reflexive
160

11 U.S.C. §101(5)(A)
It is unclear whether a union could, as a matter of law, assert a "pre-petition claim"
concerning a term or condition of employment formerly covered by a collective bargaining
agreement subsequently rejected pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §1113. Presumably, the prepetition nature of the claim would have been extinguished by operation of law.
162
Elsinore Shore Associates vs. Local 54, Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, 820 F.2d 62; Briggs Transportation Co. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341; Crowe & Associates, Inc. v. Bricklayers and
Masons Union Local No. 2, 713 F.2d 211; Petrusch v Teamsters Local 317, 667 F.2d 297.
163
A number of bankruptcy courts appear to have reached the conclusion, however.
See in particular Tom Powell & Son, 22 B.R. 657 and the underlying bankruptcy
proceedings in Crowe and Petrusch, supra; see also Lowndes, Workers' Rights at 547-48.
161
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and sparse in policy justification.
The primary argument advanced is that Congress, in establishing the
automatic stay provision of the Code in 1978, would not have repealed the
NLGA sub silentio. The counterargument is that Congress, in setting out
exceptions to the same provision, failed to explicitly except conduct
protected by the NLGA. The question is whether Congress, in failing to
expressly exclude peaceful labor conduct from the coverage of the
automatic stay, impliedly repealed the anti-injunctive provisions of the
NLGA upon attachment of the stay. The courts answer no, but provide little
explanation.
In National Association of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife,164
the Supreme Court restated its general test for determining when a laterenacted statute, such as the automatic stay provision of the Code, has
"impliedly repealed" an earlier statute, like the NLGA.165 The Court said:
While a later enacted statute . . . can sometimes operate to
amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provision . .
.repeals by implication are not favored and will not be
presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is
clear and manifest . . . We will not infer a statutory repeal
unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act
or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary . . . in
order that the words of the later statute shall have any
meaning at all.166
Unquestionably, the reviewing federal circuits have explicitly addressed
the absence of a "clear and manifest" legislative intention to repeal the antiinjunctive provisions of the NLGA. They have failed to complete the
analysis, however, by explaining that it is not necessary to construe the
automatic stay provision as overriding the NLGA "in order that the later
statute shall have any meaning at all." The circuit courts in these cases have
also underemphasized the fact that a rule under the prior bankruptcy law,
holding that a bankruptcy court could not be utilized to enjoin peaceful
labor activity, was well established prior to enactment of the Code in
164

551 U.S. 644 (2007).
The statutory provisions in question were § 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, which
required the Environmental Protection Agency to issue a "transfer application" once nine
statutory predicates had been satisfied, and § 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act which
authorized the EPA not to issue such an application unless it was not likely to jeopardize
endangered or threatened species or their habitats. Id. at 662. The issue was whether the
1973 Endangered Species Act had impliedly repealed or amended the 1972 Clean Water
Act by adding a tenth predicate. Id.
166
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
165
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1978.167 Congress took no explicit action to overturn the rule in the 1978
Code.168
Still, at least one circuit court has suggested that Congress never
considered the idea of conflict between the NLGA and the automatic
stay.169 While, if true, this would mean that Congress had no intent to repeal
any portion of the NLGA, it would also raise the question of what, if
anything, Congress might have done had it considered issues of statutory
conflict. The court's suggestion also reflects that some judges may not yet
feel precluded from assessing questions of conflict between the statutory
regimes. As a bankruptcy court in this frame of mind stated:
It may well be that Congress simply did not consider the
relationship between the two statutes . . . Where the activity
is intended to collect a debt arising out of contract as
opposed to an effort to vindicate statutory rights, outright
abdication of jurisdiction seems inappropriate. There should
be a balancing of the policy considerations underlying the
prohibitions against self-help and preferences contained in
the Code against the anti-injunction provisions of the NorrisLaGuardia Act.170
Since the 1980s was the last time when the question was considered in
any detail, the passage of time may also contribute to a sense of license to
engage in "balancing," notwithstanding the apparent nonexistence of
implied repeal.
At all events, the foregoing discussion of statutory construction may
itself be somewhat simplistic. Despite Professor Haggard's palpable
irritation at the "emotional bias" judges have continued to afford the
NLGA,171 there is a good meta-rationale for courts to reflect profoundly
before intruding on the mandates of the statute. The NLGA has been
167

Truck Local No. 807 v. Bohack, 541 F.2d 312 (2nd Cir. 1976); In re Third Ave.
Transit Corp., 192 F.2d 971 (2nd Cir. 1951); Anderson v. Bigelow, 130 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1942); Teamsters Local No. 886 v. Quick Charge, 168 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1948).
168
A development post-dating these factors adds additional weight to this argument.
When Congress amended the Code in 1984 to change the collective bargaining agreement
rejection rules, see infra n.209 and accompanying text, it failed to also amend the
automatic stay provision to explicitly apply to conduct attendant to labor disputes. As
Professor Craver has persuasively argued, this is powerful evidence that Congress has not
intended the automatic stay to apply to this conduct. See Craver, Impact of Financial Crises
at 506-507.
169
Crowe & Associates, 713 F.2d at 215.
170
In re Tom Powell, 22 B.R. at 660
171
Haggard, Apparent Conflict at 726,
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described as a New Deal super-statute, meant to eclipse all in its wake, and
embodying a "public culture optimistic about the operation of government
creating statutes conducing toward the public good."172 As the complicated
judicial history of the NLGA reveals, judges have been hard-pressed not to
recognize the NLGA as a statute that "successfully penetrate[d] public and
normative culture in a deep way."173 Courts have only with the greatest care
found implied repeals of statutes of this nature,174 and typically only under
the pressure of some truly compelling public exigency. 175
The NLGA occupies super-statute status because it established a
dramatically new federal labor policy,176 subsequently effectuated177 in
positive law,178 and at the time of its enactment enjoyed broad public
support after a long period of social deliberation. Indeed, the public
debated the NLGA for 14 years, 179 and the bill passed almost as decisively
172

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L. J.
1215, 1229 (2001).
173
Id. at 1215.
174
Id. at 1251-52 (arguing that super-statutes often afforded "super-strong" deference
because courts assume that constructions are likely to attract the attention of Congress and
to be overridden if they "misread the statute in light of its principle.")
175
See e.g. United States v. United Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)
(holding that Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to the federal government in seizing and
operating coal mines because relationship between government and workers of the seized
mines was that of governmental employer enjoying sovereign immunity and employee).
176
29 U.S.C. §102: "Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with
the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and
other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he
should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free
from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor . . . in the designation of
such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following
definitions of and limitations upon the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the United
States are enacted."
177
Though it is often contended that Congress shifted from a laissez-faire to a "legal"
framework, during the three-year interval between the enactment of the NLGA and the
Wagner Act, the more salient point may be that labor injunctions were not authorized under
the legal/regulatory framework of the Wagner Act. In this respect, the non-involvement of
the courts during the critical early phases of labor disputes was maintained.
178
29 U.S.C. §157: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities . . ."
179
"For 14 years economic forces have blocked the passage of this legislation, but I
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as the Declaration of War after Pearl Harbor.180 The vote in the Senate was
75-5 and 362-14 in the House.181 Analysis of debate transpiring during the
enactment of the statute may leave the erroneous impression that the NLGA
was debatable in a broader social sense. It was not.
Investing the Code's automatic stay with the same sense of the superstatute is difficult. Court rules of bankruptcy procedure had already
formally established automatic stay practice during the years 1973-1976.182
The codification of the automatic stay in 1978 appears to have been
undertaken primarily to alleviate the perception by secured creditors that the
court rules were arcane and unpredictable.183 Inasmuch as the breadth of the
NLGA was well established in 1978, and had already been found in the
bankruptcy context as not authorizing federal court injunctive relief, 184 the
"no-injunction rule" appears to have been part of the background law.
Accordingly, "it is difficult to justify the position that the bankruptcy courts
should provide an automatic shelter from the enforcement of laws that
persons other than debtors in Title 11 cases are required to observe."185
B.

Arbitration System and "Other Mutual Aid or
Protection"

One argument for allowing the automatic stay to operate as an exception
to the NLGA's anti-injunctive provisions is that courts have previously
permitted exceptions for good policy reasons. This argument is unsound for
two reasons. First, it reads far too much breadth into the Boys Markets
exception.186 Second, it fails to recognize that Boys Markets speaks to only
one of the core values protected by the NLGA.
This article's earlier discussion of the Boys Markets exception
underscored its essential contextual origins as a defense of the labor
arbitration system. Non-bankruptcy courts in the bankruptcy context have
generally recognized the limits of the exception.187
believe that it has behind it today the imponderable force of a public opinion that will no
longer be denied. Let us adopt this rule and pass this legislation, thereby assuring the great
masses of our working people that here in this House privilege has no place, justice is
being done, and the old ideals of democracy still survive." [Applause.] Statement of Rep.
Nelson, 75 Cong. Rec. 5468.
180
Jon R. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 37 N. D. L. Rev. 49, 49.
181
Id.
182
Kennedy, Automatic Stay II, at 4.
183
Id. at 8-10.
184
See supra n.167 and accompanying text.
185
Kennedy, Automatic Stay II, at 64 (emphasis supplied)
186
See Haggard, Apparent Conflict at
187
See e.g. Crowe at 215, Bohack at 317-18.
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In more recent decisions, Federal circuit courts outside of the
bankruptcy context have also begun to reflect a keener sense of this
contextualization, and to prevent the Boys Markets exception from
expanding to disputes only remotely touching on the arbitration system.
In AT&T Broadband v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 188 for example, Judge Easterbrook discussed a proposed exception
to the NLGA. In that case, AT&T contended that it was not obligated to
arbitrate an employment dispute that the union argued was arbitrable, and
sought an injunction to prevent the arbitration from going forward.189 After
quickly rejecting the arguably spurious assertion that arbitration itself was
not a statutory labor dispute,190 Judge Easterbrook cogently articulated the
implications of AT&T's request for yet another exception to the NLGA:
One response to this theme is that it proves too much and
would, if accepted, wipe out the core of the NorrisLaGuardia Act. The linchpin of AT&T's argument is that if
the employer has a substantive right (here, to a judicial
decision about arbitrability) then there must be a remedy by
way of injunction. It would be only a small step to plug in
other substantive rights . . . If AT&T's syllogism is
appropriate, then courts must have authority to enforce this
right by issuing injunctions. Bye, bye, Norris-LaGuardia Act,
for this was the very way in which courts evaded § 20 of the
Clayton Act! Yet in Burlington Northern the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbids
injunctive relief against a secondary boycott, despite the fact
that the boycott violated the employer's substantive rights191 .
. . What Congress established through the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is that a substantive right does not imply an injunctive
remedy. Employers have to settle for damages or other forms
of ex post review, even if they turn out to be less effective at
vindicating the underlying right.192
Similarly, the Eleventh circuit, in evaluating whether the NLGA could
188

317 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2003)
Id. at 759
190
Id. at 760-61: (opining that prohibition of injunctions in labor disputes mandated in
Section 1 of the NLGA are not limited to labor activities specifically enumerated in Section
4 of the statute; rather, the section refers to "core union operations" concerning which
Congress was shouting, "we really mean it.")
191
One may question Judge Easterbrook on this point, but it does not impact the
essence of the argument.
192
Id. at 761
189
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be interpreted to authorize injunctions to avoid arbitration, stated,
The limited judicial exceptions crafted in large part to
effectuate Congress' strong preference for labor arbitration
do not apply when a party asks for injunctive relief in order
to avoid arbitration. In such a case, the Norris-LaGuardia Act
applies and a district court has no jurisdiction to issue such
an injunction except pursuant to a statutory exception.193
The courts have begun to place the Boys Markets exception in the
appropriate context, in large measure because it is simply a fair reading of
broader underlying NLGA policy.
There remains the question of what policy, precisely, the NLGA
endorsed. A policy of "non-interference" by federal courts is certainly in
evidence, as has been repeatedly emphasized. But the purpose of noninterference, as shown by the policy statement accompanying the statute,194
is broader than the protection of collective bargaining, or of labor
organizations per se.
Both the NLGA and the National Labor Relations Act reference the
right of employees to be free from interference of engaging in concerted
activity for their "mutual aid or protection."195 In this context, the NLGA
exceptions can be read broadly as a kind of quid pro quo: employees will
forego their right to engage in certain concerted activity for their "mutual
aid or protection" in exchange for the labor system's provision of a nonjudicial dispute resolution forum for their collective bargaining agent. That
serves the collective bargaining side of the statutory formula.196 The
diminution of a vibrant arbitration system,197 however, weakens the Boys
Markets premise.
"Mutual aid or protection" is no less a part of the formula, and is
vouchsafed in the absence of statutory waivers like no-strike agreements.
Admittedly, the contours of "mutual aid or protection" have never been
clearly delineated. In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB,198 for example, a case arising
under the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court discussed the
meaning of that statute's “mutual aid or protection” clause.
The issue in Eastex was whether an employer that had prevented its
193

Triangle Const. & Maintenance Corp. v. Our Virgin Islands Labor Union, 425 F.3d
938, 952 (11th Cir. 2005).
194
See supra n.176
195
See supra n.176, 178
196
Id.
197
See supra n.88
198
437 U.S. 556 (1978).
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union-represented employees from distributing a union newsletter in nonworking areas of the employer’s property had violated the NLRA by
interfering with the statutory right for employees to engage in “other
concerted activities” for the purpose of “mutual aid or protection.”199 The
newsletter urged employees to support the union, and also discussed a
proposal to incorporate a state “right-to-work” statute into the state's
constitution, and a presidential veto of an increase in the federal minimum
wage.200 In defense of its distribution prohibition, the employer argued that
the sections of the newsletter discussing the right-to-work and presidential
veto issues did not fall within the purview of the "mutual aid or protection"
clause.201 The NLRB rejected the employer’s argument and found a
violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 202
The Supreme Court, on review, discussed various issues in finding that
the leafleting was protected. One aspect of the Court's discussion
considered the breadth of the NLRA's “mutual aid or protection” clause.
The Court observed that Congress had deliberately placed "mutual aid or
protection," along with “self-organization” and “collective bargaining,” as
the objectives at which the protection of employee activity was aimed,
realizing “that labor’s cause often is advanced on fronts other than
collective bargaining and grievance settlement within the immediate
employment context.”203 The Court agreed, however, that, "some concerted
activity bears a less immediate relationship to employees’ interests as
employees than other such activity . . . ," and that under the NLRA the
National Labor Relations Board would have to determine the boundaries of
the clause.204
If the same kind of broad reading were allowed the "mutual aid or
protection" clause of the NLGA, the question arises as to whether any of the
NLGA exceptions that have been discussed apply absent a viable nonjudicial forum. As Richard Trumka argued, in an essay objecting to the
revision of arbitration awards upon judicial review, the whole point to the
Boys Markets exception is “to prevent . . . displacement of the arbitral
199

Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. at 558.
Id. The union argued that the elevation of the state right to work law to state
constitutional status was objectionable and urged its members to write to their
legislators to oppose it. The union also criticized the President’s veto of the minimum
wage increase while the profits of the oil industry were increasing and argued that “as
working men and women we must defeat our enemies and elect our friends.” The
newsletter concluded by urging its recipients to vote.
201
Id. at 561.
202
Id. (internal citations omitted).
203
Id.
204
Id. at 567-568.
200
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process by self-help. Thus, the argument can be made that self-help
remedies become permissible once the arbitral remedy has itself been
displaced.”205 The self-help alluded to is the NLGA residuum, “concerted
activities for the purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.” Take away
collective bargaining and mutual aid or protection springs to the fore.206
In the bankruptcy context, the Boys Markets exception may continue to
apply, for it is clear that the automatic stay does not interfere with
arbitration unless a debtor rejects the collective bargaining agreement
altogether.207 However, if the debtor-employer declines to arbitrate, or if the
collective bargaining agreement is successfully rejected, the predicate for
the Boys Market exception will have fallen by the wayside. In that event,
the original justification for suspending Section 4 of the NLGA – the
provision of a forum for a labor dispute -- evaporates. Concerted activity in
response to a bankruptcy-context labor dispute would be in essence resting
on its “mutual aid or protection” laurels, and it does not appear that the
NLGA itself could furnish a justification for departing from the antiinjunction rule. The courts would lack defensible standards in any attempt
to afford primacy to a bankruptcy injunction.
An employer's right to reject a collective bargaining agreement upon
court approval raises an additional point. Some commentators in the 1980s
read into this right a broad, if implicit, understanding by policymakers that
bankruptcy law generally trumps labor law.208 With the benefit of
hindsight, two responses may now be made to this position. First,
subsequent legislative developments demonstrated that Congress, at least,
did not deem the matter that simple.209 Second, the "generally trumps"
position failed to take into account the full breadth of NLGA policies.
205

Richard L. Trumka, Keeping Miners Out of Work: The Cost of Judicial Revision of
Arbitration Awards, 86 W. Va. L. Rev. 705, 706 (1984).
206
One might object that the "mutual aid or protection" language in the NLGA is
merely a policy statement and does not have the force of positive law. See e.g. A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding National Industrial
Recovery Act unconstitutional because broad powers under Act insufficiently constrained
by mere policy statement and introduction to statute). The same, however, is true of
"collective bargaining." That both were enacted into positive law three years later in the
NLRA takes both policies beyond the realm of the merely prefatory.
207
In re Ionosphere Clubs, 922 F.2d 984, 992 (2d Cir. 1990).
208
See Haggard, Apparent Conflict, at 725 (". . . a broad reading of Bildisco suggests
that that the Norris-LaGuardia Act should now yield to the bankruptcy code"); see also
Poe, Bankruptcy Court's Dilemma, at 334 (arguing that courts considering contract
rejection issue have concluded that the "Bankruptcy Act's provisions were intended to
prevail")
209
The right is now codified in 11 U.S.C. §1113. For a brief explanation of how that
provision overruled the Supreme Court's opinion in the Bildisco case see infra at n.248. A
detailed exposition of the case is not required here.
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One court touched upon the second point in passing. In a 1970s case
pre-dating the lead-up to the new contract rejection legislation, the Second
Circuit, in Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,210
analogized a debtor-in-possession to a successor employer. This analogy
provides a useful basis for distinction between the NLGA's mutual aid or
protection and collective bargaining policies.211 Under Supreme Court
precedent, when a "successor" employer acquires a formerly unionized
"predecessor" employer, the successor may or may not have an obligation to
recognize the union,212 but will not have an obligation to honor a
preexisting collective bargaining agreement.213 Nevertheless, whether the
successor employer recognizes the union or does not, whether it honors the
preexisting collective bargaining agreement or does not, its employees in
either event retain their rights under the NLRA to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection. Those rights remain irrespective of
the status of the union's collective bargaining rights.
Similarly, the fact that a collective bargaining agreement may be
lawfully rejected speaks solely to the collective bargaining/arbitration side
of NLGA policy. Any post-bankruptcy dispute having a connection to
employment will continue to fall within the NLGA's broad definition of
labor dispute. The same result would have obtained even if a union
previously had never achieved a collective bargaining agreement with a
bankrupt employer.
B.

First Amendment Considerations

Circuit courts considering peaceful picketing and leafleting in
bankruptcy cases have not typically addressed the extent to which a
construction of the Code allowing extirpation of that conduct would
implicate the First Amendment. This is understandable because they have
been able, and would prefer, to rest their opinions on narrower statutory
grounds, but the issue has a place in a broader policy discussion.
A stay operating to forbid expressive activity on the theory that it is an
"act to obtain the property of" a debtor's estate, or that it is an "act to collect
. . . a claim . . . that arose before the commencement of the case"214 appears
210

519 F.2d 698, 704 (2d. Cir.1975).
The court was making the point that if a troubled debtor-in-possession was
compelled to honor a burdensome collective bargaining agreement it would be in a better
position than a financially healthy acquirer.
212
N.L.R.B. v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972)
(holding that successor employer generally required to recognize predecessor employer’s
union if the collective bargaining unit in question continues to be appropriate).
213
Id. at 285-90.
214
See supra n.124.
211
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to present a facial First Amendment problem. "There is no doubt that as a
general matter peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressive activities
involving 'speech' protected by the First Amendment."215 A presumption
that protest amounts to acts proscribed by an automatic stay would remove
all pretense of a carefully tailored time, place and manner restriction. 216
"Pure" protest presents the most objectionable case. During a postpetition labor dispute, a union may simply want to publically express its
opinion that the bankrupt debtor is a "rat."217 A union may wish to protest a
debtor's alleged refusal to participate in a negotiation process, as opposed to
protest of the debtor's refusal to agree to any particular bargaining term. A
union may wish to protest the discharge of an employee whom it alleges
was fired for unlawful reasons.218 These suppositions vastly understate the
great variety of situations in which unions might carry out strikes, picketing
215

U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1983). The question of the conduct element
of picketing is difficult. The judiciary has believed for some time that “[p]icketing by an
organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality
and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated,” Teamsters Local 802
v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942), and that patrolling is, accordingly, subject to
regulation. For ease of exposition, therefore, it will be assumed that the picketing in
question is not being conducted by large masses of employees, is peaceful, and does not
independently violate the law.
216
See e.g. Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association, 460
U.S. 37 (1983). It cannot be known in advance whether speech would be suppressed in a
forum in which time, place and manner restrictions would be relevant. See Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that no First Amendment right to expression on military base
exists). That, of course, is the point.
217
This discussion further assumes that all of the labor activity in question is
"primary." Primary labor activity usually consists of strikes, picketing or leafleting "of an
employer against whom the employees have a grievance." See Jerome R. Hellerstein,
Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes, 47 Yale L. J. 341, 343 (1938). Secondary boycotts
would be independently subject to injunction under the National Labor Relations Act. 29
U.S.C. 160(l). As the discussion in Burlington Northern demonstrated, however,
secondary picketing is, with limited exceptions, not unlawful, or subject to injunction,
under the Railway Labor Act.
218
Professor Haggard has noted that a union's efforts to compel an employer to agree
to collective bargaining was once found by the Supreme Court to fall within the Hobbs
Act's prohibition on "the obtaining of property from another" by the use of force. Haggard,
Apparent Conflict, 708, n.29, citing U.S. v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956) (holding that
although the Hobbs Act -- an anti-extortion statute -- by its terms was not meant to affect
existing labor law, no labor statute protected unions or their officials in attempts to get
personal property through threats of force or violence compel employers to agree to
collective bargaining and other terms and other wage demands). The NLGA does not, of
course, protect violent conduct. 29 U.S.C. §104(i). Unlawful, violent union compulsion
being defined as an attempt to "obtain property" in an anti-extortion context, says little
about how peaceful labor activity can be defined in the same way. They are not parallel
cases.
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or leafleting that are not reasonably interpretable as acts to obtain property
or as the assertion of pre-petition claims. Only one circuit court appears to
have considered these difficulties, and no circuit courts appear to have
considered the issue of the automatic stay's suppression of speech in a labor
context.
In Turner Advertising Co. v. National Service Corp.,219 a bankruptcy
court issued an injunction to prevent creditor Turner from superimposing on
billboards throughout the Atlanta metropolitan area, which it had prepared
for bankrupt debtor National Service,220"a message that the company was in
bankruptcy and may not be able pay its bills."221 National Service obtained
an injunction from the bankruptcy court to stop the display of the message.
That court ordered, “TAC cannot publish any information about NSC which
publication amounts to no more than an attempt to harass and intimidate the
debtor . . . TAC is enjoined from publishing any information about NSC
which constitutes a violation of the automatic stay of section 362.”222
Turner appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court
order on the theory that Turner’s message was misleading commercial
speech. 223 Alternatively, the district court held that the bankruptcy court
was authorized to issue an injunction even assuming Turner’s
communication was pure speech.224
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.225 The court first
determined that Turner’s threatened message was not commercial speech
because it was neither a solicitation for a sale or purchase nor a mere
advertisement.226 Determining that Turner’s intended communication was
“pure speech,” the court concluded that the bankruptcy court’s injunction

219

742 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1984)
National Service was a Sears franchisee, and the billboards had originally depicted
"Sears Authorized Plumbers;" Sears litigated the matter aggressively. Id. at 861-62.
221
Id. at 860
222
Id. at 861. National Service originally obtained an ex parte order:
220

[R]estraining TAC from taking any action or doing anything designed to or having
the effect of collecting, assessing or recovering on any claim arising before [the
filing of the bankruptcy petition . . . [and] . . . enjoin[ing] TAC from publicly
stating that NSC was a debtor in a Chapter 11 case or from conveying any
message, directly or indirectly, which would adversely affect the business done by
Sears or NSC in any area in which either or both were engaged in business.
Turner Advertising Co. v. National Service Corp. at 861.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 862
226
Id.
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was an impermissible prior restraint on first amendment expression.227 In
support of its conclusion the court stated:
A review of the bankruptcy and district courts' decisions
demonstrates that the content of TAC's message was
restrained and prohibited. The blanket provisions of the
bankruptcy judge's order prohibited TAC from disseminating
its message simply because the message was thought to be
threatening to NSC. The mere fact that NSC would be
damaged by TAC's dissemination of the message, however,
does not warrant a prior restraint.228
It might of course be argued -- and at least one commentator has made
the argument229 -- that Turner’s actual objective was to compel National
Service to pay the overdue bill that was at issue, not to engage in protected
speech. The point, however, is that in the bankruptcy context an automatic
stay attaches immediately. When, as in Turner's case, a sweeping, ex parte,
preliminary injunction follows the stay, the purpose and content of Turner's
communication was suppressed ab initio. Whatever a prior restraint may
be, 230 the Fifth Circuit was not prepared to uphold an injunction premised
on speculative harm that was probably damnum absque injuria.231
Justice Scalia made the same point respecting prior restraints forcefully
and eloquently:
The danger that speech-restricting injunctions may serve as a
powerful means to suppress disfavored views is obvious
enough even when they are based on a completed or
impending violation of law . . . The temptation in cases
involving issues of social controversy--precisely the cases
227

Turner Advertising Co. v. National Service Corp. at 862. The court repeated
the familiar rule that “[w]hen the content of pure speech is restrained and
prohibited, the restraint bears a heavy presumption against its validity and
mandates the closest scrutiny.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
228
Id. citing Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971);
N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
229
Douglas E. Deutsch, Ensuring Proper Bankruptcy Solicitation: Evaluating
Bankruptcy Law, the First Amendment, the Code of Ethics, and Securities Law in
Bankruptcy Solicitation Cases, 11 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 213, 237 (2003).
230
See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L. J. 409, 420
(1983) (stating that prior use doctrine is a “formulation whose current contribution to the
interpretation of the First Amendment is chiefly confusion”).
231
Damnum absque injuria: "Loss or harm that is incurred from something other than a
wrongful act and occasions no legal remedy." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
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where the First Amendment's protections are most needed-will always be for judges to discern a “policy” against
whatever-speech-looks-bad-at-the-moment.232
In the labor context, the Supreme Court has been careful to interpret
labor statutes restricting peaceful labor conduct with an expressive
component in a manner that avoids First Amendment issues.233 Bankruptcy
courts would be well served to exercise particular caution whenever it is
alleged that peaceful picketing closely resembling "pure" protest is violates
the automatic stay.234
C.

Damnum Absque Injuria

Under the surface of the cases assessing the interplay between the
automatic stay provision of the Code and the anti-injunctive mandate of the
NLGA percolates the question of whether a labor dispute's potential for
inflicting economic injury to a bankrupt entity attempting reorganization is
damnum absque injuria -- an injury for which the law affords no remedy.235
Despite the seeming harshness of this position, it is perfectly consistent with
longstanding law, following the ancient maxim that the destruction of
business occasioned by lawful strikes is damnum absque injuria. 236 Oliver

232

Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1114 (1995) (emphasis supplied)
In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades, 485
U.S. 568 (1988), the Supreme Court interpreted Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
Relations Act, proscribing secondary labor pressure directed against neutral employers, as
allowing peaceful, but arguably secondary, leafleting. The opinion was contrary to the
National Labor Relation Board's reading of the statute. The Court, however, utilized the
rule of statutory construction that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute
would raise serious constitutional problems, [it] will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Id. at 575
citing N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979). Concluding
that the suppression of peaceful leafleting would unnecessarily raise serious constitutional
problems, the Court chose an alternative construction avoiding First Amendment
difficulties. Id. at 578.
234
One method to accomplish this objective would be to require the debtor, in
circumstances involving peaceful picketing or leafleting, to show cause why the court
should not summarily reject the allegation.
235
See supra n.231
236
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 134 (1842) (declaring that "Journeyman
Bootmaker Society" was not chargeable with conspiracy, because it engaged in no
underlying unlawful acts, even assuming that the intent of the society was to "impoverish"
master and journeyman bootmakers, and a master cordwainer); Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass.
572, 584-85 (1906) (holding that the destruction of business by labor unions' right of
competition lawful provided strike is lawful)
233
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Wendell Holmes reflected upon the argument long ago.237 Holmes thought
that society was a net beneficiary of the struggle between labor and
capital,238 and that if labor acted in its legitimate self-interest,239 without an
unlawful object,240 it should be allowed to "combine," even if the effect of
the combination was to inflict injury on its "antagonist."241
Both the Crowe and Bohack decisions addressed this question in the
bankruptcy context as an afterthought. In Crowe, the court, recognizing the
potential harshness on the employer-debtor of its refusal to enjoin the
union's picketing, stated:
We recognize that this legal result casts upon Crowe
inequities . . . But Crowe has no control over many economic
forces [that] affect the outcome of its reorganization.
Moreover, the strike is a legitimate weapon, designed to strip
the employer of economic control. The labor laws recognize
that a strike may drive an employer out of business.242
The court in Bohack expressed a similar view:
The argument is made that to allow picketing in the case of
this financially troubled debtor is to put it out of business.
That is, unfortunately, sometimes the sad outcome when a
union and an employer cannot come to terms. But the policy
of our labor laws is simply to provide rules for the handling
of labor disputes, not to prohibit the use of economic power
in the resolution of such disputes. By filing under Chapter XI
an employer does not become clothed in immunity from
union action.243
One bankruptcy court responded in the following manner to a union's
assertion that it would strike in response to the court's allowance of the
rejection of the union's collective bargaining agreement with an employer:
The [union] has stated that it will strike if the Debtors are
allowed to reject their collective bargaining agreements, and
237

Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 108
239
Id.
240
Id. at 107
241
Id. at 109
242
Crowe & Associates, 713 F.2d at 216.
243
Teamsters 807 v. Bohack, 541 F.2d at 318.
238
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force the union to accept the terms its members previously
rejected. A strike is an inherent risk in every [contract
rejection action], and in the end, it makes little difference if
the Debtors are forced out of business because of a union
strike or the continuing obligation to pay union benefits to
avoid one. The unions may have the legal right to strike, but
that does not mean that they must exercise that right. The
union's right to strike carries with it the burden of holding the
fate of the rank and file in its hands. Little purpose would be
served by a strike if a strike results in the termination of
operations and the loss of jobs by the strikers.244
That view reflects closely the traditional labor law, "mutually assured
destruction" position in these matters,245 which in turn reflects a societal
cost-benefit assessment that has not been repudiated in seven decades. As
Holmes also said, however, "[p]ropositions as to public policy rarely are
unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of
unanswerable proof."246 One fundamental policy of bankruptcy
reorganization is to capture the "going-concern value of a business."247 This
policy is at odds with any competing policy even marginally less protective
of reorganization or permissive respecting liquidation.248
The tension here cannot be denied. As Professor Warren has explained,
however, bankruptcy policy is made up of competing interests in a way that
is not always efficient or necessarily protective of the broader public
interest:
The rationale for protecting parties without formal legal
rights may simply be political in nature; such protection
encompasses a wider range of voters than the particular
creditors who would profit from the immediate enforcement
of their rights. Moreover, some of the parties without formal
244
245

In re Horsehead Industries, 300 B.R. 537, 587 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2003)
For a persuasive argument along these lines see Craver, Impact of Financial Crises

at 507.
246

Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. at 106
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 336, 350 (1993) [hereinafter Imperfect World]
248
See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 524-25 (1984) (rejecting
standard that debtor in possession should not be permitted to reject the collectivebargaining agreement unless it can demonstrate that its reorganization will fail unless
rejection is permitted in favor of much less strict standard). Congress subsequently
overruled Bildisco and Bildisco in several respects, including by establishing that the
collective bargaining agreement may not be rejected unless the equities clearly favor it.
247
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legal rights have well-organized political clout. The presence
of a few clear giveaways to successful lobbying groups
makes it clear that the Bankruptcy Code is no more immune
to political influence than any other legislation Congress
passes. On the other hand, many of the beneficiaries of the
indirect protection for parties without legal rights are, at best,
only loosely organized groups that have shown little interest
in the bankruptcy laws.249
To imagine, therefore, that any conflict between the NLGA and the Code
would represent a contest between clearly defined, inherently antagonistic
policies is illusory. If unions are rent seekers in reorganization dramas, then
they are exerting pressure outside of the formal bankruptcy process,
competing with learned hands that have exacted more sophisticated rents
within the labyrinth of the formal process.250 Indeed, it is precisely in light
of the shifting, intangible, contours of bankruptcy policy that Professor
Warren cautions bankruptcy judges to confine their decisions to the Code
itself:
This observation leads to a question of application. Should a
judge base a decision specifically on the interests of these
parties without formal legal rights? Some judges believe they
can discern and protect the public interest. I would argue that
249

Warren, Imperfect World at 356
Recent events have vividly underscored these policy inconsistencies. In a Railway
Labor Act case decided by the Second Circuit, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 483 F.3d
160 (2nd. Cir. 2007), judge John M. Walker, Jr., a first cousin of former president George
W. Bush, upheld an injunction forbidding a union from engaging in work stoppages in
protest of stalled negotiations during bankruptcy proceedings. Judge Walker opined that
the union had "not sought to persuade its members of the need to 'face up to economic
reality,'" and had "fail[ed] to take account, as it must, of the duty Northwest “owes the
public[.]” Id. at 176. Implicit in this statement, of course, is the notion that the rights of
labor have little to do with the "public interest." See generally Seltzer & Ciantra,
Government by Injunction.
Meanwhile, another first cousin of former President George W. Bush, ex-Lehman
executive George W. Walker, felt it necessary to apologize to other Lehman officials when
a fellow Lehman executive had the temerity to suggest that executive bonuses be foregone
in light of the impending Lehman bankruptcy. See Statement of Chairman Henry Waxman,
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, The Causes
and Effects of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy, October 6, 2008, p. 55, lines 1139-1150
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081010150253.pdf. (last visited July
22, 2009).
250

.
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they should not go beyond the statutory mandate to permit a
reorganization effort bounded by enumerated legal
constraints. To enlarge those rights beyond the estate's
opportunity to reorganize risks upsetting the balance of
interests established by the legislature.251
This point returns the discussion to the NLGA's starting premise:
legislatures should make labor policy, not judges purporting to implement
the law of dissimilar legal regimes. It is doubtful that the architects of the
NLGA would have thought it particularly likely that bankruptcy judges
interpreting the Code would be able to keep their underlying views of a
labor dispute separated from their ultimate substantive decision.
CONCLUSION
It is disingenuous to attempt to evade the intent of the framers of the
NLGA. A famous late judge of the federal Northern District of Ohio, Don
John Young, Jr., probably expressed the mood of the enacting Congress as
well as any commentator could:
In spite of the many years that the Norris-LaGuardia Act has
been on the books - in which the Congress declared very
forcibly by enactment of that legislation that they expected
the era of robber-barons to come to an end; that was a time
when the courts were mere minions of wealth and power to
keep the people of the country under subjection - in spite of
that, wealth and power doesn't give up so easily. It still wants
to go on running things the way they were in the Good Old
Days when it was in the saddle. But I think we have to do
what Congress says we should do and that Congress wanted
labor matters to be resolved in other tribunals than the courts,
and therefore unless there can be a very strong showing that
this court has jurisdiction and that there are reasons why it
should exercise the extraordinary power of injunction that
the court should bow to the will of Congress and not exercise
those powers which the Congress indicated that it should
not.252
Ideology aside, federal courts are simply not authorized to issue
251

Id. at n.47
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. International Longshoremen's Association, No.
C 79-292, 1979 WL 2000 at *1 (N. D. Ohio May 23, 1979).
252
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injunctions in labor disputes in other than the very narrow exceptions
discussed in this article. Bankruptcy injunctions certainly do not explicitly
fall within those exceptions. The policy reasons for not interpreting the
Code as implicitly carving out bankruptcy exceptions are substantial.
Courts continue to recognize the passionate view of the 72nd Congress, and
implicitly of the generation of which it was a part -- echoing across decades
-- that federal courts should not be permitted to issue injunctions that have
the effect of extinguishing labor disputes in their early stages. A reversal of
course respecting this deeply held view of the need for social catharsis
would be dramatic, and should be effectuated, if it is to be, by the
representatives of the people. The firewall should be respected.

